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The moment life began was defined at the beginning of
the nineteenth century by the mother's awareness of fetal
movement.

That moment was called quickening.

The common

law of England and of the early United States embraced
quickening.

Prior to quickening abortion was legally and

socially benign.

Abortion was a non-issue, for life was not

considered to exist before the fetus was quick —

which

usually occurs in the fourth or fifth month of gestation.
At the early stages of fetal development there was no
difference between terminating pregnancy and simply
restoring menses.
By the end of the nineteenth century, the quickening
doctrine was no longer the key to abortion law.

The

doctrine was dismantled for a variety of reasons. The
American Medical Association (AMA) played a major role in
the movement to redefine the moment of animation and
restrict abortions.

The physicians' motivation was not

concern for the fetus.

The physicians gained status and

power from the restriction of abortion; they emerged from
iv

the century as the only abortion authority.

Physicians

alone were able to sanction abortions.
Changes occurred in the nineteenth century that
increased the sense of urgency of the physicians' campaign.
They utilized sensitive issues to persuade state
legislatures to act.

The main issues included a shift in

the women seeking abortions and disparities in the
population trend.

In the 1840s there was an upsurge of

married women in the upper classes having abortions.
Abortion was no longer for the shamed single women.

That

trend combined with the increasing number of births among
the lower class and foreign born to concern native America
that they were going to be outbred.

The physicians

capitalized on eugenics and collective fear among the most
powerful section of the population —

the law makers.

Religious disparities in the population growth also
concerned the primarily Protestant physicians.

The fear and

distaste is clear in their rhetoric.
Physicians were empowered by the sole ability to grant
abortions, emerged as primary care givers, and successfully
lobbied state legislatures for the alterations in law that
allowed them to fill those roles.

The common law quickening

doctrine was transformed until a near prohibition on
abortion existed by the 1880s.

The termination of legal

abortions fueled by the AMA lasted for nearly a century.

v

Introduction

In the early 1800s written guides and folklore supplied
women with methods to terminate pregnancy.

In 1810, an

article written by Joseph Brevitt provided multiple means
for a woman to restore menses.

The process was called the

"restoration of menses" as opposed to abortion.

The concept

of abortion was nonexistent for Americans in the early
nineteenth century.

Pregnancy was not considered to exist

until the fetus was able to move and the mother was aware of
such activity.
child.

From that moment the woman was quick with

Before the instance of quickening the woman's

condition was indistinguishable from the absence of
menstruation.

Terminating gestation was not at all criminal

prior to quickening.

Law and society did not recognize

fetal life before that moment of animation.1
By the late nineteenth century, women were being
prosecuted for seeking abortions along with the people
providing the procedure.

Pregnancy existed from the moment

of conception according to legal authorities.

Interrupting

gestation gradually became illegal, and courts sentenced
1

Joseph Brevitt, Female Medical Repository
1810), 46-47.
1

(Baltimore,

2
women and abortionists.

The climate concerning abortion in

the United States was clearly transformed during the
nineteenth century.
In an eighty-year period the transformation of abortion
law was complete.

It shifted from nonrestrictive to almost

completely prohibitive in character.

There was no law

addressing abortion at the country's inception.
Legislatures began altering the toleration of abortion in
the 1820s; by the 1880s, physicians were essentially the
only people able to sanction a legal abortion.

The forces

driving the metamorphosis included racism, class bias,
eugenics, nativism, and the ambition of the American Medical
Association.
As in other areas of law, North American colonists
adopted the English common law concerning abortion.

The

common law maintained that animation was the crucial moment
of gestation.

Common belief held that animation occurred

when the mother noticed fetal movement.

The awareness of

movement signified that the mother was "quick" with child
officially carrying a child with a soul.

—

Based on that

theory of animation, the quickening doctrine guided common
law.

According to the doctrine, abortion prior to

quickening was equated with simply restoring a woman's
menses.

Before that magic moment, people considered

pregnancy something blocking the woman's menstrual cycle.
Restoring menses under such circumstances was not criminal,
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nor did a negative social stigma accompany the action.

Even

after quickening, abortions were simply misdemeanors.2
The newly formed United States firmly accepted the
quickening doctrine.

The 1812 Massachusetts Supreme Court

reaffirmed its validity in the case of Commonwealth v.
Bangs.3

The court ruled that without evidence of

quickening, the abortionist was not guilty —
simple misdemeanor.

even of a

A crucial aspect of the common law

fortified by Bangs was that the woman was immune from any
legal complications.

The person performing the abortion or

administering the abortifacient was the only party
potentially accountable at law.

The early law of the United

States was committed to a woman's immunity in abortion cases
—

her guilt was not an issue in instances of self-induced

abortion or for seeking abortive services.

The legal system

also strongly supported the legality of abortions prior to
quickening.
The adherence to quickening changed as the United
States matured.

Connecticut passed the first piece of

legislation that addressed abortion in 1821.
followed Connecticut's lead.

Other states

The initial phase of

legislation mentioning abortion addressed the issue as part
of a broad criminal code.

The laws resembled anti-poisoning

2

Lionel H. Frankel, Law, Power, and Personal Freedom
(St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1975), 379.
Commonwealth v. Bangs (Massachusetts, 1812).

4
laws, maintained the woman's immunity, and acted as
protective legislation.

The first series of laws did not

counter the legality of abortions before quickening; it
simply sought to protect women from potentially negligent
abortionists.

The quickening doctrine and perceptions of

abortion were altered as a variety of societal forces
developed.
In the early-to-mid-nineteenth century there were
several phenomena that occurred almost simultaneously.
emerging factors were mutually reinforcing.

The

One major

factor was the significant increase in the visibility of
abortion services.

Abortionists and abortifacients were

initially confined to the private realm.

Self abortions at

home using home-grown concoctions were typical.
Commercialization led to a thriving new market in which some
abortionists prospered significantly.

With

commercialization, new patent medicines appeared based on
traditional herbal remedies.

Commercialization also meant

the advent of the mail order abortifacient business.
Eventually even devices intended to procure abortion were
sold via the newspaper.

In addition to frequent newspaper

advertisements, urban areas were inundated with circulars.
Commercialization furthered the transformation of abortion
from a private home issue into a public practice.
Determining the number of women who terminated their
pregnancies is difficult given the absences of detailed

5
records and the ease with which abortion could be privately
procured.

Prior to the surge of commercialization, evidence

of abortion is apparent in the number of home medical guides
that discussed methods of inducing abortion, the frequency
of remedies passed in cookbooks, and the testimony of
medical figures.

During the commercial phase, the great

fortunes amassed by abortionists serve as evidence of the
practice.

Testimony concerning the increase in number of

abortions was quite common among physicians of the period.
The doctors supporting the founding of the AMA compiled
reports that estimated abortions in some areas averaged one
in every four live births.

Trends in population growth also

indicate that family limitation was fairly common
particularly among native segments of society."

The rise in

estimated abortions coupled with the increased visibility of
abortion services and concerns about disparities in
population growth heightened American sensitivity to
abortion.

These factors also provided physicians with

ammunition to elevate their status.

They rallied around

abortion and highlighted the changing trends in American
society.
The fact that married, upper-class women were seeking
abortion services increased sensitivity to the abortion
issue —

particularly given the disparity in procreation

"Robert V. Wells, Uncle Sam's Family;
Issues and
Perspectives on American Demographic History
(Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1985), 38.
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rates between foreign newcomers and native white Anglo Saxon
Protestant, (WASP), America.

Physicians used those

sensitivities to further their campaign.

They also

reevaluated the traditional acceptance that life began at
the moment of quickening.
adopted moral rhetoric.

They denounced the doctrine and
This denunciation propelled the

physicians into the prominent status of being not only
medically knowledgeable, but also morally superior to those
medical "quacks" still willing to act as abortionists.
Physicians participating in the AMA referred to themselves
as "regulars"; medical authorities not involved in parallel
medical and educational pursuits were called "irregulars."
Rhetoric almost exclusively identified irregulars in female
terms and was filled with contempt.
The alteration in the attitudes of physicians combined
with their ambition to involve legislatures in rectifying
the abortion situation made an impact on abortion laws.
Physicians successfully worked to alter public opinion.

Not

only did they write state legislatures and submit abortion
reports that they compiled, but they also bombarded the
press.

The press began to sensationalize abortion deaths,

even though they were financially supported in part by the
abortifacient advertisements in their papers.

Such coverage

alone did not propel state legislatures to revise abortion
codes, but it helped to create an environment that was not
publicly opposed to such measures.

The physicians' ambition
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seems to have had the greatest influence on the evolution of
abortion legislation protecting women from dangerous
abortifacients to prohibiting the practice unless sanctioned
by a physician.
The "regulars" were motivated based on a need to rally
around a topic that would elevate their status.
became an issue that raised people's concerns.

Abortion
Originally

it was not considered a deviant act, opposed to God's law,
or contemptible.

Once the physicians' campaign stripped

quickening of significance, abortion was redefined as a
moral issue.

The physicians spearheaded the move away from

quickening and embraced the prohibition of abortion at law.
Social factors aided the physicians.

Social trends such as

the decline in population, the disparity in native and
foreign birthrates, and the increase in abortions among
married women were repeatedly highlighted by physicians
addressing abortion.

Ethnic, racial and class solidarity

united some people, most importantly men sitting as
governmental representatives, in favor of the physicians'
campaign and concerns.

The idea that women were rejecting

motherhood to pursue fashion and leisure was also promoted
in their writings.

Abortion facilitated the move away from

traditional roles.

The deviation reinforced the problem in

class and racial procreative disparities.
were activists against abortion.

The physicians

They operated their

campaign with insight regarding the concerns most likely to
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incite people against abortion.

They wielded the most

explosive possible weapon against legal abortion.

Once

illegal, physicians would not have to struggle with the
Hippocratic Oath, knowledge of animation, or competition
from those willing to provide their patients with any
service desired,

including pregnancy termination.

The campaign to halt the practice of abortion through
legislative means was partially successful.

Legislation was

framed in a manner that restricted abortions, unless
sanctioned by physicians.

Though legislatures installed

anti-abortion laws in the United States, the nineteenthcentury transformation did not render the practice extinct.
Physicians successfully emerged as the dominant medical care
givers.

The medical profession was also able to call the

clergy and legislators to assist in the alteration of common
law notions concerning animation and abortion.

It was

transformed into a public issue, and those three groups of
moral authority figures were vocalizing the negative aspects
of terminating pregnancies.

Governing authorities were

willing to temporarily accept a legal prohibition of
abortions.

Abortion remained an alternative for pregnant

women, though the practice was again decommercialized.
Instead it became a private, underground phenomenon during
the majority of the twentieth century.

Social and Legal Acceptance of Abortion

The Common law passed on from England to the colonies
did not discourage abortion in any waymenses was not equated with abortion.

Restoring one's
Terminating a pre-

quickened pregnancy was legally and socially acceptable; the
act was considered to be so benign that it was not a public
issue.

Abortion existed exclusively in the private realm

unitl the mid 1800s.

Methods of abortion, however, did

circulate among women.
Conversation and experience provided women the means to
increase their understanding of their bodies.

Midwives were

a main factor in the spread of information useful to women.
Women in the nineteenth century shared their wisdom fairly
openly with each other.

Historian Carroll Smith-Rosenberg

declared after an examination of the Schlesinger Library's
cook book collection that "women collected and exchanged
recipes for medicines as routinely as they did for pies and
cookies.115

Women were urged to understand the importance of

menstruation —

it was the area of their physical life taken

5

Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Disorderly Conduct: Visions of
Gender in Victorian America (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf,
1985), 228.
9
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taken most seriously-

Women and their medical advisors

believed that the absence of menstrual flow (amenorrhea), an
excessively heavy flow (dysmenorrhea), and menstrual cramps
(menorrhagia) could lead to serious illness and even death.
Because of the importance assigned menstruation, women
had access to methods that could restore normality to their
menstrual cycle.

A large portion of such information was

dedicated to the restoration of menses.

Given the absence

of pregnancy tests, amenorrhea and pregnancy were
indistinguishable until the mother was aware of fetal
movement.

Women used abortifacients to restore menses in

either situation.

The identical treatment of the

indistinguishable conditions meant that enforcing laws
concerning abortion would be extremely difficult.

The

intention of administering abortifacients was impossible to
prove.

Once quickening occurred, the mother was still the

only party to know unless she shared that information.
Abortions were accessible to women in North America
prior to the commercialization of the abortion industry.
There were three main types of abortion —
chemical, and operative.
and danger.

physical,

All had potential for both success

When pondering the danger of abortion, it must

be considered relative to the perils inherent in childbirth
prior to advanced medical knowledge.

Particularly early in

gestation, the risk of induced miscarriage seemed less
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dangerous and frightening than actual childbirth and other
complications associated with pregnancy.6
The operative method became more frequent with
urbanization and commercialization.

For Native Americans

and early Americans, the first two categories were more
readily accessible and required less assistance.

Operative

methods were usually performed at "lying in houses" and the
recovery period was monitored.

Lying in houses were

boarding houses where women underwent the abortive procedure
and spent the recovery period.

Physical and chemical

methods were much more private, and less obvious to the
community at large.

Physical methods of inducing a

miscarriage include hot baths, heavy and prolonged exercise,
adjustments and manipulations altering the circulatory flow
to promote uterine contractions, and violent procedures
targeting the lower abdominal region.

The physical methods

could produce abortion, though it was difficult to balance
the activity to cause disruption of the pregnancy while

6

Janet Farrell Brodie, Contraception and Abortion in
Nineteenth Century America
(Ithaca:
Cornell University
Press, 1994), 41-42; Brodie's work is an excellent piece on
the trends in the nineteenth century; she emphasizes the
contraception movement, though her research on the
anti-abortion movement is quite revealing.
James C. Mohr's
Abortion in America is also a well written source about
abortion policy in the nineteenth century. Mohr's examination
is soley of abortion; contraception is not adressed to any
significant extent.
Mohr's examination of abortion policy
extends beyong the decline of the quickening doctrine and the
ramifications of that alteration.
Mohr considers the
evolution of the polarized nature of the abortion debate.
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maintaining the health of the woman.7

Chemical methods

could also prove damaging, even fatal to the woman, if
caution was not used in determining dose and frequency of
the various concoctions.
Chemical abortifacients fall into one of four
categories —

purgatives, intestinal and pelvis irritants,

uterine contraction stimulants, and systemic poisons.
Purgatives included aloe, castor oil, and croton oil.
Pennyroyal oils, savin, rue, and tansy could act as
intestinal and pelvis irritants.

Quinine, ergot, and

pituitary extract were used to stimulate uterine
contractions.

The systemic poisons included lead salts,

apoil, kerosene, mercury salts, oil of wintergreen, and
nitrobenzene.

Ideally, systemic poisons would act more

quickly on the fetus than on the woman.8
Operative methods were designed to dislodge or remove
the fetus by entering the uterus through the vaginal canal.
Cutterage was a method of scraping the uterine walls, and it
became increasingly more damaging to the woman as gestation
progressed.

Following the third month of pregnancy,

dilation of the cervix was a possible abortive method, as
was puncturing the amniotic sac.

Early attempts at such

procedures reportedly included the use of umbrella ribs,
7

Harold
Rosen,
Abortion
in
America:
Psychiatric,
Legal
Anthropological.
and
Considerations
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 6.
8

Ibid.

Medical,
Religious
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darning needles, hat pins, wire, and wood.

Given the nature

of the utensils and the tendency towards infection,
operative methods were the least safe.9

When stories of

abortions that led to a woman's gruesome death were
publicized, they were frequently of the operative variety.
Herbs were the most readily available abortifacients.
Exposure to the Native American community and the AfricanAmerican slave community increased colonists' knowledge of
herbal solutions.10

Nicholas Culpeper revealed twelve

botanicals associated with miscarriage in The English
Physician and Complete Herbal.

The twelve herbs mentioned

were common to gardens in New England, and were identified
as herbs to "bring on a woman's courses."

The preparations

included calamint, sage, honey suckle, pennyroyal, common
groundpine, brake fern, bistort or snakeweed, and gladwin.11
Pennyroyal was used by some Native American women and was
colloquially referred to as "squammint."

American medical

plant authority Charles Millspaugh said pennyroyal "will
often bring on the menses nicely; and, if combined with a
gill of brewer's yeast, it frequently acts well as an

9

Ibid., 7-8.

10

Though there are limited accounts of slave women's
experience with abortion, there are descriptions of the use
of cotton root by slaves to procure abortion.
Various
physicians and plantation owners comment on the abortion
phenomena in Herbert George Gutman, The Black Family in
Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925 (New York:
Pantheon Books,
1976), 80-82.
"Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 42.
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abortivant, should the intender not be too late with her
prescription.1,12
Other sources indicated the abortive properties of the
mint species including savory, spearmint, peppermint,
rosemary, marjoram, European lavender, catnip, American
horsemint, balm, horehound, and hyssop.13

Fourteen of the

most toxic plants in United States' folklore were labeled
abortifacients.

They included foxglove, white and black

hellebore, may apple, boneset herb, the crowfoot family,
mistletoe, bloodroot, and castor bean.

Some Native American

tribes used "black cohosh," a member of the crowfoot family,
and perhaps the most effective of the herbal preparations.
In the late 1600s in Middlesex, Massachusetts, there were
four noted attempts of producing abortion with savin boiled
in beer.

Of those attempts one proved effective.14

Once a woman began to suspect menstrual obstruction,
including pregnancy, she typically initiated a certain
routine.

She began by soaking her feet in hot, herbed water

or drinking herbal teas.

The second step was possibly to

breathe herbal vapors followed by the application of "herbal
mixtures or mustard plasters to her breasts."

Participating

in slightly taxing physical activity was also a part of the
"Charles
(Philadelphia:
Medical Plants

Millspaugh,
Medical
plants
2
vols.
John C. Yorston, 1892), reprinted as American
(New York: Dover, 1974), 463-464.

"People also attributed the mint species with the ability
to prevent conception and remove a dead fetus.
14

Brodie, Contraception and Abortion, 43.
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standard routine.

If menstruation did not follow, the

routine was repeated, though the amounts of herbs and
exercise were increased.

The process could continue for a

few months or until pregnancy was certain.
the procedure became more complicated.

At that point

By the seventeenth

century, it became increasingly common to restore menses
using cervical instruments.

After another hundred years

women were using slippery elm bark to procure
abortion. 15
The accessibility of abortifacients and the frequency
of their mention in herbal guides and home medical manuals
indicate that, though a private act, abortion was imbedded
in American life.

Just as abortions were feasible based on

the availability of abortifacients, there was not a single
piece of legislation deterring or regulating abortion until
1821.

Before the advent of pregnancy tests, the absence of

menses and pregnancy were indistinguishable early in
gestation.

Both relied upon the same remedies.

The shared

symptoms of amenorrhea and pregnancy made enforcing abortion
laws near impossible once such legislation existed.

Proving

the intent of the person administering an abortifacient was
critical —

for anti-abortion legislation was penned to

prevent the termination of pregnancy, not the restoration of
menses.

ls

Ibid. , 42.

The Quickening in Early Legislation

In matters of law, the doctrine of quickening was the
essential moment in the development of a fetus.

The

doctrine held that the fetus became viable upon quickening.
Quickening was the moment of animation, the first moment
that the mother could feel fetal movement.
developed by theologian Thomas Aquinas.

The doctrine was

His philosophy of

quickening determined that the mother's awareness of
movement signified the moment that a soul entered the
fetus.16

English common law embraced Aquinas's theory.

Common law was then transplanted into the North American
colonies and influenced the U.S. legal system for two
centuries.17
In his definitive Commentaries, on the common law,
William Blackstone claimed that "Life begins in the
contemplation of law as soon as the infant is able to stir
in the mother's womb."18

Under the common law abortion

16

John T. Noonan, Jr. , "Aquinas on Abortion" in St. Thomas
Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York:
W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1988), 245.
17

Though quickening was removed from most state statutes
as a full prohibition of abortion was adopted, as late as 1956
there was still mention of quickening as a distinction in
Mississippi.
16

17
prior to quickening was not a crime at all.

After

quickening the act of abortion was considered a misdemeanor.
The term "criminal abortion" applied strictly to postquickened terminations and the crime was minor.

According

to Blackstone,
If a woman is quick with child, and, by a potion,
or otherwise, killeth in her womb, or if any one
beat her, where by the child dieth in her body,
and she is delivered of a dead child, this, though
not murder, was by the ancient law homicide or
manslaughter. But the modern law doth not look
upon this offence in quite so atrocious light, but
merely as a heinous misdemeanor. But if the child
be born alive, and afterwards die in consequence
of the potion or beating, it will be
murder.19
The most significant points of Blackstone's statement
include the absence of any scorn toward pre-quickened
abortions and the party responsible for the act.

Because

the woman does not come under fire for the abortion, the
common law resembled and, once codified, became protective
legislation.
mother.

The law monitored the abortionist, not the

This point is essential to understand the evolution

of abortion legislation.

Later, as the burden shifted and

the mother became the guilty party, the legal environment

18

Lader, Abortion (New York:

Bobbs Merrill, 1966), 78.

"William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1861), 129, and
note; for a concise discussion of the common law in England
see Amos Dean, Principles of Medical Jurisprudence: Designed
for the Professions of Law and Medicine (Albany:
Gould,
Banks, and Company, 1854).
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was prime for the prohibition of abortion rather than simply
the regulation of abortionists.
Another significance of the quickening doctrine is the
way it allocates the power to terminate gestation.

If the

critical moment at law is when the mother feels fetal
movement, then the mother has a knowledge that no one else
is capable of knowing.
determination.

She alone could make that

Medicine held that the magic moment occurred

in the fourth or fifth month of gestation.

Until that

moment the mother might easily mistake pregnancy with
amenorrhea.

Midwives, medical practitioners, partners, and

the community at large could not know when the fetus was
legally viable.

There were no pregnancy tests, simply the

word of the woman, and this proved a tremendous impediment
to enforcing the evolving legislation.

As regular

physicians began to alter their philosophy about terminating
pregnancies, a pregnant woman could opt to seek treatment
for menstrual blockage without disclosing her suspicion of
pregnancy and if enough time had passed, not revealing
quickening.

Though women lacked legal and social equality,

in instances of pregnancy they possessed power, for only
they had the knowledge concerning fetal movement.
As mothers became culpable and physicians reexamined
the accepted significance of quickening, legislatures
altered the doctrine beginning in the 1820s and extending
into the 1880s.

The medical profession rethought quickening

19
and regulars began to scoff at the notion that animation
occurred when the mother felt movement —
animation at the moment of conception.

as opposed to
The changes in

perception about the advent of fetal life and culpability
were major factors in the evolution of abortion legislation
leading to a general prohibition.

When women were

considered guilty for pursuing termination options, then
abortion legislation was no longer intended to simply
protect women from shady abortionists.

Prohibition of the

practice was not the intent of initial abortion legislation;
it was only an option once women themselves were subject to
criminal prosecution for terminating their pregnancy.
In 1812 the Massachusetts Supreme Court firmly upheld
the common law tradition of quickening as the critical
distinction in the case of Isaiah Bangs.

In Commonwealth v.

Bangs, Bangs was charged with administering an abortifacient
to his wife.

The abortifacient that he administered

successfully terminated the pregnancy.

Bangs was acquitted

based on his wife's prequickened condition.

Since the

pregnancy had not quickened, it was impossible for Bangs to
have known if his wife was indeed pregnant. 20

Without

certainty of pregnancy it was not possible to determine the
intent of the person administering an abortifacient.

The

same potion was able to procure abortion or cure amenorrhea.

20

Commonwealth v. Bangs 9 Mass. 369 (1812).

The case set an important precedent in U.S. abortion law.
The Bangs decision entrenched the idea that pre-quickened
abortions were legally acceptable.

Strong in the first half

of the 1800's, this interpretation faded at different points
in several states after mid century.
Initial legislation addressing the question of abortion
occurred between 1821 and 1841 as a response to concerns
that some abortifacients were too dangerous for women to
ingest.

During this twenty-year period, one federal

territory and ten states passed abortion legislation of some
variety.

The General Assembly of Connecticut passed its

first abortion statute in 1821.

The law stated that

Every person who shall, willfully and maliciously,
administer to, or cause to be administered to, or
taken by, any person or persons, any deadly
poison, or other noxious and destructive
substance, with an intention him, her, or them,
thereby to murder, or thereby to cause or procure
the miscarriage of any woman, then being quick
with child, and shall be thereof duly convicted,
shall suffer imprisonment, in Newgate prison,
during his natural life, or for such other term as
the court having cognizance of the offence shall
determine.21
The Connecticut statute more closely resembled a measure to
curb dangerous poisonings and not an attempt to strike at
the legality abortion or the quickening doctrine.

The

concern centered on poisons which, when consumed, posed as
threat as serious to the mother as it did to the fetus.

21

The Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut ,
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21
Historian James C- Mohr declared that the law "did not
proscribe abortion per say; it declared illegal one
particular method of attempting to induce an abortion...."22
The law did not mention operative and mechanical methods of
producing abortion.
Perhaps the most significant point in the legislation
is that it maintained the quickening distinction.

The

administration of poisons was only illegal if the woman was
quick with child.

The person held culpable by the law was

not the woman carrying the fetus, but the person responsible
for administering the poison.

By targeting the provider of

the potion and not the woman seeking the abortion the law
was an attempt to protect women from people willing to sell
dangerous substances as abortifacients.

Since the

administer was the target and other methods of abortion
remained untouched, the 1821 statute did indeed closely
resemble anti-poisoning legislation.

An objection to

abortion was not the main motivation behind Connecticut's
law —

instead it was a public health issue.

It was an

attempt to protect women quick with child from those willing
to sell and administer potentially fatal poisons.23
Missouri and Illinois passed similar legislation in 1825 and
22
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1827 respectively.

They both dealt with abortions induced

by poisons and acted as protective legislation.

The laws

varied from Connecticut's in that the quickening distinction
was not included.

Though the law did not explicitly lay out

the quickening doctrine, this was a function of assumption
rather than a departure from the doctrine.

The intention of

the person administering the poison was crucial to
determining if a crime had been committed.

In order to

prove that abortion was the intent of the person
administering the potion, they had to know if the patient
was pregnant.

In order to know that the woman was pregnant,

she obviously would already have felt fetal movement and
thus be quick with child.

The word "quickening" is not

present in either state's first statute, but by outlining
that the administer was only culpable if intending to
procure abortion, quickening is an issue —

abortion could

not be the intention if the woman was not quick with child
since quickening was the only certain confirmation of
pregnancy.

Neither state was rejecting the distinction.24

The state of New York passed legislation in 1828 which,
like Connecticut's law, seemed protective in nature and
codified English common law.

24

The New York statute did not
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address abortions occurring before quickening, nor did it
target the woman herself.

The law did prohibit abortions

induced by any method after quickening.

The person

performing an abortion after quickening was guilty of second
degree manslaughter if the abortion was successful or if the
woman died.

If the abortion was unsuccessful and the mother

survived the procedure, then the abortionist was not guilty
of anything.

The attempt itself was not a criminal act, and

the woman was not culpable.

In this sense the New York law

has a protective nature and not a strict anti-abortion tone.
New York's law served as a model for other states'
legislation as it distinguished punishment based on
quickening and provided an exception.25
The New York law read
Every person who shall willfully administer to any
pregnant woman, any medicine, drug, substance, or
thing whatever, or shall use or employ any
instrument or other means whatever, with intent
thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such
woman, unless the same shall have been necessary
to preserve the life of such woman, or shall have
been advised by two physicians to be necessary for
that purpose; shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment in a county jail no more than one
year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.26
The clause sanctioning physicians to determine necessity
introduced a new concept in American law.
25
26
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medical professionals to make a therapeutic exception.

That

power grew in significance as physicians lobbied for an
unconditional ban on abortion and rethought the quickening
distinction.

The result of the therapeutic exception was a

paradox in the physicians' theory.

With the complete

prohibition of abortion besides the therapeutic exception,
the power to seek an abortion shifted drastically.

The

regular physicians had a great deal of influence on the
introduction and passage of medical related legislation.

In

New York the regulars oversaw the appointment of members to
the standing committee on medical practice through the
speaker of the assembly.27
The second piece of legislation addressing abortion in
Connecticut occurred in 1830, eight years after the first.
The first law resembled an anti-poisoning statute as an
attempt to address a public health issue, not to strike at
the legality of abortion.

The 1830 bill included a section

that made abortion induced by instruments after quickening a
crime.

The punishment for such an act was seven to ten

years in prison.

Again the party liable was the person

performing the act.

Interestingly, the lawmakers determined

the standard sentence for performing post-quickening
abortion with an instrument was less severe.

Those breaking

the anti-poisoning statute faced a life sentence, though the
27
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law deemed seven to ten years appropriate for mechanical
abortionists.

Abortions before quickening were still legal,

regardless of the method attempted.28
The law was still a protective maneuver rather than a
response to a strong objection against abortion.

The intent

of the law's framers was to protect women from the
potentially untrustworthy abortionists in the field.
Neither piece of legislation deviated from the common law
quickening distinction, and both allowed the option of
abortion prior to quickening.

The lawmakers still held to

the notion that animation occurred at quickening.

It was

the physicians, not the lawmakers, who initially challenged
that notion.
Ohio passed another piece of abortion-related
legislation that attempted to uphold public safety.

The

1834 bill made abortion attempts that resulted in the
woman's or fetus' death after quickening a felony.

The law

also stated that abortion was a misdemeanor without
mentioning quickening.

The section addressing abortion was

included with clauses designed to reduce
by physicians.

One such clause forbade the prescription of

medicine while intoxicated.

28

potential abuses

The Ohio law falls into the

The Public Statute Laws of the State of Connecticut,
1830 (Hartford, 1830), 255.
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category of early abortion legislation designed to protect
people from physicians.29
The quickening distinction remained either explicitly
or implicitly based on the need to prove intent.

In 1835

Missouri legislators toughened their 1825 law that dealt
with poisonings.

The statute inserted a section concerning

the use of instruments to induce abortion after animation.
Instrumental abortions became offenses equal to poisonings.
Abortions prior to quickening were made a misdemeanor.

This

was almost completely unenforceable since to have an
abortion one must first be pregnant.

The only way to

determine pregnancy was through quickening, and abortions
were identical to treatments used for amenorrhea.

An 1837

Arkansas law equated postquickening abortions with
manslaughter but maintained the common law stance accepting
pre-quickened abortions.

In 1839 Mississippi made

postquickening abortions second-degree manslaughter though
pre-quickened abortions remained perfectly legal.

The same

year the territory of Iowa passed an anti-poisoning law that
resembled the first piece of legislation in Connecticut.

In

1841 Alabama made all abortions after quickening a criminal
offense.

The statute did not use language of the

"Statutes of the State of Ohio (Columbus, 1841), 252.
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quickening doctrine though it prohibited abortions of
"pregnant women" which was synonymous with "quickened.1,30
In 1840 Maine enacted the strictest abortion law to
date.

At the same time the legislature introduced the bill,

significant changes were occurring in the population.
Physicians were also reevaluating their definition of
abortion.

The Eastman-Everett Act of 1840 declared the

abortion of any pregnant woman was a crime.
pertained to any pregnant woman —

The law

pregnancy defined as

carrying a quickened child or an unquick fetus.

It diverged

from the idea that pregnancies before quickening were not
the same as those afterwards.

The statute applied to all

methods of inducing abortion.

Like New York's law, it

contained a therapeutic exception.
punishment was the abortionist —
jail if the procedure failed.

The party facing
a $1,000 fine or a year in

If the fetus was aborted, the

jail time increased to five years.31
The Supreme Court of Maine tested the Eastman-Everett
Act in 1853.

The case illustrates the problems of

3
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enforcement that accompanied any abortion legislation prior
to the sophistication of pregnancy tests and medical
knowledge of women's cycles.

Though the act sought to alter

the common law distinction of quickening, there was another
point that allowed the release of abortionist Mr. Smith.
Justice John Tenney determined that though Smith caused the
woman's death by inserting a metal wire into her uterus,
Smith's intention was integral to the court's decision.

He

could have meant to treat some condition other than
pregnancy, according to Justice Tenney.

The intention of

the abortionist was an essential ingredient in an abortion
trial —

one that added to the difficulty of convicting

abortion providers.

Though the law was the most stringent

to date in the United States, it was nearly impossible to
enforce.32

It was difficult to prove that an abortionist

was treating an unquickened woman for pregnancy.

Without

proof of intention, there was very little chance that the
court would be willing to convict an abortionist.
All of the aforementioned states' legislation
concerning abortion was a portion of larger bills addressing
crime.

The abortion issue had not been a subject that

received a great deal of attention as a single issue.
Reaction to the laws was nonexistant in the media
32
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religious figures were equally silent.33

The populace at

large and the church leaders were not focused on abortion as
an issue.

Instead, the debate concerning abortion was

unique to the legal and medical professions.

The laws

emerged as a reaction to the potential abuses among people
who were trusted to provide medical attention.

Regular

physicians were interested in controlling medical practices.
The Hippocratic Oath and the reduction of competition from
physicians of the irregular variety fueled the regulars'
desire.

Both motives become apparent when examining their

efforts in the nineteenth century.

The legislators were

interested as a matter of public health and, as apparent in
New York, were directly influenced by regulars controlling
post appointments.
All of the legislation detailed thus far targeted the
abortionist.

The woman was not culpable; the trusted

medical figure was.

Women's freedom from legal guilt

stemmed from legislatures' desires to protect, not prosecute
women.

The laws sought to protect women and regulate the

medical community for questionable practices.

Since

abortions were believed to become more dangerous as
gestation advanced, the quickening distinction fits nicely
into the public safety issues in abortion clauses.

Not only

did quickening work into the public health issue, quickening
had not yet been dismantled in a campaign by regular
33
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physicians that viewed pregnancy as an uninterrupted process
resulting in human life.
By 1840, only ten of the nation's twenty-six states had
addressed abortion through legislation.
abortion after quickening a crime.

Half of those made

The other five did not

explicitly mention quickening as a distinction, but some
implied quickening through the term pregnant.

All of the

legislation was virtually unenforceable in terms of prequickened abortions.

A combination of factors, however,

altered the course of abortion legislation in the second
half of the ninteenth century.

The factors included a shift

in those women seeking abortions, the commercialization of
abortifacients, the increased awareness of women about
abortion options provided by "irregulars,"

a nativist fear

of being outbred, and the efforts of professionalizing
physicians —

a category which has numerous layers.

Those

changes created an environment that accepted increased legal
restrictions on abortion.

The Fear of Growing Population Disparities

The population of the United States declined
significantly during the nineteenth century.

Among white

native-born married women, the birth rate declined fortynine percent during the century.

The average number of

children dropped from 7.04 children to 3.56 children by
1900.34

Horatio Robinson Storer determined that in 1846

there was an abortion for every ten pregnancies carried
full-term.

He then determined that only ten years later the

number jumped to one abortion for every four births.

He

also stressed that, "innumerable ones occur that are never
recorded."35

By 1898 the Michigan board of Health reported

that a third of pregnancies in the state ended in abortion.
The Board estimated that married, wealthy women composed
seventy to eighty percent of the abortion clientele.36
The birth rate declined with more proclivity in the
1840s than it did during any other decade in the nineteenth
century.
34
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concerning the need for abortion legislation.

The

statistical evidence on decreasing births was used by the
AMA and concerned physicians to bolster support for abortion
prohibition.

They were able to use population concerns to

support their success and boost the esteem of doctors as
moral crusaders with the power to determine issues of life
and death.

The most remarkable language used by regular

physicians concerned birth rate disparity between social
classes, differing ethnicities, and even among different
religious groups.

Class bias, fear of racial extinction,

and eugenics are all apparent in speeches and testimonies
offered by the regular physicians.
A recurring complaint of physicians was that women
were more heavily influenced by fashion and leisure than by
a desire to entrench themselves in motherhood.

Carroll

Smith-Rosenberg describes the underlying contradiction
presented by such complaints.

Bourgeois women were expected

to present themselves in a manner that stood juxtaposed to
the presentation expected of a woman immersed in the cult of
True Womanhood.

The Bourgeois woman was defined by society

as educated, polished, active in social service, and
sophisticated.

They were to reinforce the class level of

their husband and financial provider.
expected to limit their fertility.

They were also

In contrast, women in

the cult of True Womanhood were expected to be domestic,
docile, and fertile —

roles confined to the private sphere.
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The emergence of the bourgeois matron meant that women
themselves, especially as wives, threatened the traditional
role assigned to women.37

Society expected two quite

different functions of women.
The bourgeois woman was bearing fewer children.
Couples were postponing marriage until their mid-to latetwenties, and there was a more conscious effort to space
children at greater intervals.

The educated, middle-and

upper-class women were reducing their progeny.
reduction concerned physicians.

This

The falling birth rate was

problematic and scary to the pillars of bourgeois societyThe fear stemmed from disparity in the falling number of
children —

not all ethnicities and classes were

experiencing similar reductions in the birth rate.

Middle

and upper-class white Anglo-Saxon Protestants were
procreating less than others in the country.

That disparity

sparked an intense fear that the WASP in America was being
outbred by the poor, the immigrants, and the nonProtestants.38

The language makes it clear that this

concern was major.

Eugenics flood the rhetoric —

there was

a belief that the WASP population was the most worthy of
procreation.
abortions —

One way to combat the problem was to prohibit
if the lower classes were fruitful, the upper

classes should have no other option but to bear children in
37
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equal numbers.

This prohibition appeared to be a logical

solution given the shift in the abortion clientele.
Abortion was no longer only for shamed, single women.

It

had spread into the very foundation of what WASP society
deemed to be American excellence.
In 1869 Dr. Hugh L. Hodge addressed the legal
profession in a piece titled Foeticide. or Criminal
Abortion.

His intention was to procure abortion legislation

by motivating the legal profession.

The language in

Foeticide is representative of typical presentations made by
physicians involved in the movement.

Hodge emphasized that

abortion is "daily perpetuated in every part of the land,
not only by the ignorant and degraded, but by those whose
education and reputed moral worth and refinement had
apparently raised them even above suspicion of vicious
designs." 39

Hodge's experience, also typical of his fellow

regular physicians, indicated that the "artificial causes of
abortion are frequent both in the married and unmarried, and
more frequent in the better classes of society than among
the poor."40

Hodge also argued that the new devotion to

fashion and a decline in devotion to the Glory of God was a
39

Hugh L. Hodge, Foeticide, or Criminal Abortion:
A
Lecture Introductory to the Course on Obstetrics, and Diseases
of Women and Children
(Philadelphia:
University of
Pennsylvania, 1869), reprinted in eds. Charles Rosenberg and
Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, Abortion in Nineteenth
Century
America (New York: Arno Press, 1974), 4-5.
4

°Ibid. , 17.

35
broad societal trend.

Abortion was an obvious and tragic

symptom of this societal reprioritization.

Hodge included

testimony from obstetrician and former professor Dr. Gilbert
who stated, "I have been called often upon by ladies of the
most undoubted character, who very innocently suppose that
it cannot be wrong to produce an abortion, so long as there
is no quickening."

Gilbert was shocked that high society

and church women increasingly requested abortive services.41
Another doctor with twenty-five years experience
expressed his fear that abortion by married, upper class
women "is very extensively practiced among married women
without the slightest compunction, and as a consequence I
believe that the number of children has materially fallen
off."42

These testimonies of experience fueled the debate

that upper-class women, both married and single, were
seeking abortions at the expense of the birth rate.
Religious distinctions among abortion seekers were also
a point of contention for some nineteenth-century
physicians.

One doctor identified only as Dr. J.C. said,

"in the matter of abortions, that the greater number of
those which I have attended spring up in Protestants...; I
have never treated a case in a Catholic or Hebrew which I

41
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believed to be willful."43

Dr. David Gilbert testified that

"It is a fact well known to practitioners, that communing
members of the Catholic and Israelitish churches are not
guilty of this crime."44

Dr. A.S. stated that Catholic

women "are very much more free from the vice of criminal
abortion than other women."

Doctor J.M.C. was also

concerned about the religious disparity.

He noted that

"Protestant women practice criminal abortion without any
apparent misgivings of its gross impropriety, provided that
the act is anterior to quickening...."
Catholic women was the opposite.

His experience with

Protestant divine Reverend

John Todd, D.D. of Boston noticed that "the practice of
criminal abortion is far more common among Protestants than
Catholics."45

Horatio Storer attributes the more frequent

abortions among Protestants solely to widespread ignorance
concerning the true nature of abortion among the community
and society as a whole.

He rejected conventional thought

that Protestant churches were condoning abortion.46
The physicians' movement was concerned with an
increasing religious disparity in the emerging population.
Physicians desiring to organize into a professional
43
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association were typically sons from a wealthy family who
studied in Edinburgh or with the more prominent American
physicians.

Those sons were not only from wealthy families,

but most frequently from families of the Protestant faith as
well.

Based on the traditional composition of regular

physicians, they were among the group that was procreating
least quickly.

The collective fear of being outbred was

personal to the regular physicians of native and
economically elevated stock.

They were among those being

outbred.
Horatio R. Storer did not attempt to disguise his
longings for continuing WASP superiority when he attributed
abortion with the increasing "ill health of our women and in
the gradual dying out of our native population...."47
According to Storer, "It was proved... that in one state,
one of the wealthiest in the Union, the natural increase in
population, or the excess of births over deaths, has of late
years been wholly by those of foreign origin."48

Storer's

attention to the increase in the foreign population at the
expense of the native born feeds off of collective WASP
fear.

This fear drove the organizing physicians' collective

action and acted as a significant spark to legislators.

The

47
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power structure was composed of mainly WASP men, so that
collective compulsion to act had a political and legislative
outlet.

Storer's colleague Andrew Nebinger shared the fear

of increasing foreign populations.

Nebinger determined

"that wherever the births most exceed the deaths, there the
foreign element most abounds; but where the population is
made up mostly or entirely of the original native stock, the
births and deaths approximate near together...." 49
Storer believed all members of the community to be
responsible for the shortcomings and "evil deeds" of the
community at large.

Abortion, according to Storer, was a

"crime not merely against the life of the child and the
health of its mother, and against good morals, but it
strikes a blow at the very foundation of society itself."50
His believed that all members of the community should stand
against abortion activity.

By turning abortion into a crime

against all white, native-born Americans, he advanced the
transition of abortion into the public sphere, and it became
a political and community issue.

Eugenics and fear created

a prime environment for abortion legislation to transform
from protecting the mother to prohibitive legislation
intended to protect native's position in the country.

49
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Storer believed that community attention should be focused
on informing individual women of abortion evils and on
reforming abortionists.
Another example of Storer's rejection of individualism
and embracement of community ideas is reflected in his
memories of coverture —

a common law doctrine involving the

absorption of a woman's legal identity into her husband's
upon marriage.51

Storer expressed regret that coverture was

abandoned at law and noted that, "Formerly men had control,
exclusive and entire, of any possessions of their wives."
The implication seems to be that if men had control of all
their wives' possessions then perhaps curtailing the
frequency of abortions could be done with ease.

Storer

seems to hold women responsible for the abortion "crisis."52
Women, according to Storer, preferred "to devastate
with poison and with steel their wombs, rather than...
forego the gaieties of a winter's balls, parties, and plays,
or the pleasures of a summer's trip and amusements."53
Storer despised abortion and the underlying priority shift
accompanying its frequency among the wealthy women of
America.

He deplored the idea that America's wealthy women

"For a discussion of coverture see Michael Grossberg,
Governing the Hearth;
Law and the Family in NineteenthCentury America (Chapel Hill:
The University of North
Carolina Press, 1985).
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were increasingly interested in exploring pursuits that
conflicted with the traditional relational roles as doting
mother and wife.

Storer held that women belonged in the

domestic sphere.

By abandoning domesticity women were

rearranging the structure of society —
according to Storer.

a detestable act,

Storer urged that women not pursue

nontraditional pleasures and instead dedicate themselves to
procreation and the maintainence of community well-being.
Storer's finger-pointing at women was significant
because it reflected shifting attitudes concerning abortion
and the slant of legislation.
were imposed to protect women —
culpable party at law.
apportionment of guilt.

Formerly all restrictions
the abortionist was the

Storer rejects the traditional
In Storer's mind, even "if the

mother does not herself induce the abortion, she seeks it,
or aids it, or consents to it, and is, therefore, whether
ever seeming justified or not, fully accountable as a
principal." 54

By shifting responsibility and guilt to

women, in addition to physicians who agreed to perform
abortions, prohibiting all abortions became significantly
more logical.

If women were held responsible for the

declining native population, and for the unnatural act of
abortion, then the solution to the problem was prohibiting
their option to abort.

54
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Prohibiting abortions would be more

41
effective than simply placing restrictions on those
providing abortion services.

In addition, preventing

women's option to abort would prevent women from
overstepping the traditional role allotted to females.
Storer did not believe that women were able to make a
rational decision concerning pregnancy, particularly while
pregnant.

Storer maintains that a "woman's mind is prone to

depression and, indeed, to temporary actual derangement,
under the stimulus of uterine excitation."

During pregnancy

she is accordingly susceptible to whims that she would
otherwise not be drawn to.55

Storer neglects to note that

women would obviously not be prone to consider abortion
while not pregnant.
The attachment of abortion guilt to women themselves
was also significant.

The connection between rhetoric

opposed to women seeking abortions and the alteration of the
common law tradition had tremendous importance on the
increasing regulation of the practice.

A major step toward

the prohibition of abortions was the prosecution of women in
addition to the abortionist.

Legislation targeting only the

abortionist was originally framed as a protective measure.
Targeting women in abortion legislation demonstared the
transition from protective to prohibitive legislation.

This

shift was in direct conflict with the immunity provided to

55
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women at common law and its early codification.

The

rhetoric of the physicians' campaign also challenged common
law notions beyond women's immunity.

Physicians attacked

the validity of quickening doctrine itself, and they
publicized their dissension beginning in the 1840s.
Doctors reevaluated the quickening distinction.

They

began to see pregnancy as a process with no one moment any
more important to the development of life than any other
moment.

As D. Humphrey Storer, Horatio's father and

professor of obstetrics and medical jurisprudence at Harvard
University, said, "The moment an embryo enters the uterus a
microscopic speck, it is the germ of a human being."

He

continued to state that, "it is as morally wrong to endeavor
to destroy that germ as to be guilty of the crime of
infanticide.1,56
The instant that the mother became aware of fetal
movement was no longer thought by the physicians to be a
moment with grand significance.

Animation did not occur the

instant fetal movement was noticeable, but rather the
physicians declared animation and conception occurred
simultaneously.

The emergence of the new philosophy was a

major turning point for abortion law in the United States.
Quickening remained as a step in gestation, but it no longer
held the significance of determining life or the presence of
56
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a soul.

Storer was clear in announcing that "children are

fully alive from the moment of conception,...." 57

Hugh

Hodge refuted the quickening doctrine by declaring that,
"the embryo is nevertheless endowed, at once, with the
principles of vitality; and, although retained within the
system of its mother, it has, in a strict sense, an
independent existence." 58

Dismantling quickening and

establishing an independent existence of the fetus combined
with the dissolution of women's common law immunity opened
the gateway for strict anti-abortion laws.
The acceptance of animation at conception introduced a
new need in abortion legislation, the consideration of
rights.
crime?

At what point was the mother guilty of a serious
When did fetal life become equal to and greater in

importance than the woman's traditional ability to access
abortion services with ease?

Another question to be

addressed at law involved exceptions to the statutes.

It is

paradoxical that the physicians, who preached animation at
conception and the absolute evil inherent in abortion, were
the group allotted the power to make exceptions to their
absolute beliefs.

The therapeutic exception, increasingly

common as legislation evolved, meant physicians could allow
abortion, the very act that they

rhetorically bashed.

The

contradiction in the physicians' position is explained by
57
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the power that regulars gained from the authority to grant
abortions.

That power significantly increased their status

and helped to entrench regulars as the most qualified
medical professionals.
In addition to fear of growing population disparities
and a shift in the way some prominent physicians viewed
abortion, there were other societal factors at work.

The

most significant of which included the commercialization of
abortifacients and the rise of mass urban newspaper
circulation.

Together they created an atmosphere for the

introduction of a new wave of abortion laws.

The visibility

and increasingly public nature of abortion were significant
elements in the evolving debate.

Abortion practices were

changing, in addition to its clientele and public profile.
Before the 1840s women most commonly procured abortion
in their home.

That fact was not completely altered after

1840, though commercialization and advertisements of
abortion remedies publicized the practice to a large extent.
By the 1844, the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal
reported the presence of six practitioners selling
abortifacients in the local area.59

In-home abortifacients

on the market consisted of pills, fluid extracts, and oils.
The majority were pills and fluid extracts with one
outstanding ingredient, typically an aloe or black
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hellebore.

The minor ingredients in the typical pill

included a blend of powdered savin, iron, ergot, and solid
tansy and rue extracts.

Women were advised to take the

pills and drink tansy tea twice daily until the obstruction
was removed.

Fluid extracts were oils of savin, tansy, or

rue contained in alcohol with wintergreen added to make the
potion ingestible and palatable.

Some of the concoctions

were effective, though a number of recommended remedies were
not.
The abortifacients were sold under commonly known terms
including the "Female Regulator," "Periodical Drops," the
Uterine Regulator," and "Woman's Friend."

The phrases were

merely suggestive though the product labels made the
potential use apparent.60

Warnings typical to a subtly

titled abortifacient advised the user that the concoction
would surely cause a miscarriage if used by women in their
early months of pregnancy.

Boston based drug firm Goodwin

and Company in 1847 sold seven brands of pills targeting
women.

The brands included "Hardy's Woman's Friend,"

"Belcher's Female Cure," "Lyons's Periodical Drops," and
"The Samaritan's Gift for Females."

In 1885 Chicago

druggists Fuller and Fuller marketed "Dr. Caton's Tansy
Regulator," Colchester's Pennyroyal and Tansy Pills,"
Colchester's Pennyroyal Pills," and Cook's Cotton Root
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Compound."

All of those were attributed with the

restoration of menses and ability to trigger a miscarriage.
The label on "Graves Pills for Amenorrhea" stated that,
"These pills have been approved by the Ecole de Medicine,
fully sanctioned by the M.R.C.S. of London, Edinburgh,
Dublin, as a never failing remedy for producing the
catamenial or monthly flow.

Though perfectly harmless to

the most delicate, yet ladies are earnestly requested not to
mistake their condition as MISCARRIAGE WOULD CERTAINLY
ENSUE."61

Even in 1900, after the legislative shift, the

E.L. Patch Company in Boston offered emmenagogues through
their catalogue.

The pills were "Chocolate covered, 5 1/4

gram tablets with one grain each cotton root, iron sulfate,
aloes, ergotin, black hellebore, and 1/4 min. oil of
savin. "62
Abortive instruments were also commercially available
with growing frequency after the 1840s.

Devices designed to

produce an abortion were sold through the mail, in retail
drug stores, and by wholesale druggist' mail order
catalogues.

A wide variety of instruments were available.

There were different styles and models of both uterine
sounds and dilators.

By the 1850s, catheters, speculums,

and uterine sounds were given attention in medical

""Criminal Abortion," Druggists Circular 2 (1858), 139.
62
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journals.63

An article in the American Medical Times,

titled "Instruments of a Notorious Abortionist," described
forty different abortion instruments.

The majority of the

devices were simplistic, including spoons with bent handles,
wires attached to pen holders, and placenta forceps. 64
In 1875 physician W.M. Smith from Atkinson, Illinois,
discussed the success and danger of instrumental abortions
in a letter to the editor published in Medical and Surgical
Reporter.

Smith

said, "After the failure of tansy, savin,

ergot, cotton root, lifting, rough trotting horses, etc., a
knitting needle is the stand by.

One old doctor near here

was so obliging as to furnish a wire with a handle, to one
of his patients, which did the work for her, after which she
passed it to one of her neighbors, who succeeded in
destroying the foetus and nearly so herself." 65

Given the

great potential for failure of pills, fluid extracts, and
oils, the instrument provided another course of action.
Women turned to surgical methods after exhausting herbal
possibilities. 66
When women turned to abortion services outside their
home and attempted non-herbal abortion methods, they sought
"Ibid., 225-227.
64

"Instruments of a Notorious
Medical Times 6 (1863), 34.

Abortionist,"

65

American

W.M. Smith, Letter to the editor, "The Prevalence of
Abortion," Medical and Surgical Reporter 33 (1875): 259.
85

Mohr, Abortion in America,123-124,291atn.14.

48
the aid of a midwife or went to a lying-in boardinghouse.
Midwives identified the nature of their business to the
public with a flag dangling from a window.

By the mid

1800s, the majority of abortionists were referred to as
"female physicians."

Both New England and the Midwest had

lying in abortion services within their borders.

The

establishments were privately owned boardinghouses, clinics,
and offices.

Legal historian Janet Farrell Brodie admits

uncertainty about the number of such facilities, though they
were typically managed by midwives trained in Europe.67
One such facility was New York City's Lying-in
Institute located at 6 Amity Place.
managed by Julia and H.D. Grindle.

The operation was
Their circulars from the

1860s mention the abortion methods available, including
powders and the vaginal syringe.

The actual advertisement

guarantees "certain relief to ladies at one interview with
or without medication.1168

The Grindles also offered a

bottle of pills, sold for two dollars, "which when taking
according to directions will remove all obstructions of the
womb and bring on the menstrual periods, from whatever cause
produced."
"Caution:

67
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of pregnancy it will be sure to produce a miscarriage.
However, if any should make a mistake and a miscarriage be
the result, it will not in the least injure their health."69
The Grindle's operation was fairly lucrative, though the
couple

encountered multiple law suits as a result of their

success.
In 1868, Mr. Grindle was indicted on abortion-'charges.
A woman died following a suspected abortion while
recuperating at the Grindle's facility.

Grindle was

acquitted since there was no proof that the abortion caused
her death.

She simply died while staying at their boarding

house.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Grindle were indicted four years

later.

They sold a woman a twenty-dollar bottle of

abortifacients.

The judge declared that the Grindles were

not guilty as the woman did not tell them that she was
indeed pregnant.

Th»a intended use was thus in question, and

the couple was not culpable-at law for selling
abortifacients to a woman with child.70

The Grindle's

interaction with the law, however, was minor compared to
what other abortionists faced.

The story of Ann Lohman

illustrates the room for success and ruin when operating a
large scale abortion service.
Ann Lohman's abortion service from 1839 to 1877 proved
tremendously lucrative.

Lohman became the most infamous
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abortionist in New York.

Her fame warranted a cover name;

she was known as "Madame Restell."
abortionists she had European roots.

Like many of America's
She was born in

Painswick, England, and later returned to England
immediately before delving into the abortion services.
Restell's operation was large scale and was aggressively
advertised.

Restell's first advertisement was printed in

the New York Sun on March 18, 1839.

The advertisement

announced the arrival of Restell in the world of family
limitation.

She attempts to intrigue all readers who are

interested in the advantages of family limitation.

The

advertisement reads
TO MARRIED W O M E N . — It is not but too well known
that the families of the married often increase
beyond the happiness of those who give them birth
would dictate? In how many instance does the
hard-working father, and more especially the
mother, of a poor family remain slaves throughout
their lives, "urging at the oar of incessant
labor, toiling to live, living but to toil," when
they might have enjoyed comfort and comparative
affluence; and if care and toil have weighed down
the spirit, and at last broken the health of the
father, how often is the widow left, unable, with
the most virtuous intentions, to save her
fatherless offspring from becoming degraded
objects of charity or profligate votaries of vice?
Is it desirable, then, is it moral for parents to
increase their families, regardless of
consequences to themselves, or the well being of
their offspring, when a simple, easy, healthy, and
certain remedy is within our control?
The advertiser, feeling the importance of this
subject, and estimating the vast benefit resulting
to the thousands by the adoptions of means
prescribed by her, (introduced by the celebrated
midwife and female physician, Mrs. Restell, the
grandmother of the advertiser,) and who has made
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this subject her particular and especial study,
has opened an office, where married females can
obtain the desired information.71
In addition to newspaper advertising campaigns, Restell
utilized circulars.

Circulars proved an effective method of

spreading information about her abortion office and the mail
order business.

Restell offered women a solution to

unwanted pregnancy.

Besides the pills she sold, a simple

operation was available at her office.

Restell's pricing

methods were based on a sliding scale.

The average wealthy

woman was charged $100 for the procedure while her poorer
sisters may only be charged $20 . 72

Restell scholar Clifford

Browder determined that "her circulars were in demand, her
reception room was never empty, and when she opened her
office in the morning, she might find a half dozen customers
at the door."73
Restell's life illustrates the potential to earn a
fortune in abortion services and displays the alteration in
the law's tolerance for abortionists.

Prior to her arrest

in 1878, her services were in such high demand that she
opened branches in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.74
71
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Her career is testimony that women were seeking abortions in
fairly large numbers, and that married women were the target
of advertisements.

It is significant that even her first

advertisement in 1839 singled out married women as the ones
to benefit from her services.

Newspapers advertisements

like Restell's increased the visibility of abortion, and
drew attention to the fact that abortion was not simply for
the single woman hoping to avoid shame.

Abortion was

available and sought out by married women, it was not only a
recourse for the desperate, but it was also a method of
family limitation.
The advent of urban newspaper mass circulation was a
major factor in the commercialization of abortion and the
anti-abortion campaign in the early 1840s.

The increase in

circulation was a result of an increasing urban population,
printing industrialization, and the increased attention to
commercial advertising.

The circulation of the penny press

furthered the commercialization of the abortion industry,
and raised urban consciousness about abortion options.
Thus, abortion was removed from the private world of woman
seeking advice from other women —

placing it solidly into

the lap of the male-dominated commercial and public world.
Newspaper coverage of abortion ironically undermined
the very people paying to advertise in the papers.
Advertisements for abortionists and abortifacients were a
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regular source of income for the newspapers.

During a

single week in 1845, The Boston Daily Times ran
advertisements for "Dr.

Melveau's Portuguese Female Pills,"

"Madame Restell's Female Pills," "Madame Drunette's Lunar
Pills," "Dr. Monroe's French Periodical Pills," and "Dr.
Peter's French Renovating Pills."75

Given the amount of

paid advertisements the newspaper received in one week
alone, it is ironic that the newspaper industry
simultaneously began to undermine its financial
contributors.
Competition between the urban newspapers sparked a wave
of sensationalism.

The ultimate goal was to grab reader

attention, even if to do so meant diverging from truth and
objectivity.

Abortion was an issue which the newspapers

were able to sensationalize with success.

Particularly as

anti-abortion rhetoric increased, the emotionally charged
issue was a gold mine for the penny press.76

The same

industry that helped to catapult abortion services into the
commercial world simultaneously furthered the efforts of
anti-abortion crusaders.
The New York Police Gazette turned the abortion issue
into a series of stories meant to incite fear.

The

sensational stories claimed that women were systematically
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disappearing.

The Gazette published stories claiming that

abortionists actually sold the aborted baby bodies to
medical schools.

The fetuses would then be used in medical

experimentation.

A cover picture on the March 13, 1847

issue of the Gazette shows a woman of fashion with devils
wing's in place of her arms.

The attractive woman is

pictured with a fang-toothed devil head peering from her
pelvis while munching on a plump infant.77

The woman is

clearly depicted as unnatural and deviant, as dangerous and
destructive. 78

The devil imagery symbolized the rejection

of God's natural order and the absence of goodness in the
action.

The New York Police Gazette offered dramatic

examples of the sensationalization of abortion.
Mainstream newspapers also sensationalized the coverage
of abortion stories, including the New York Times.

The

Times coverage became even more forceful when George Jones
assumed the position of manager and Louis John Jennings
began as editor-in-chief.
deadly abortions.

Coverage of abortion focused on

Daily articles and editorials were firmly

against unrestricted abortion and called for prohibitive
legislation.

The Times tied two of the most prominent anti-

abortion arguments —

the protection of women and the

definition of abortion as murder.
77
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reporter Augustus St. Clair wrote that abortion facilities
were filled with thousands of people who "are murdered
before they have seen the light of this world, and thousands
upon thousands more of adults are irremediably ruined in
constitution, health, and happiness." 79

The Times also

furthered the physicians' quest by identifying abortionists
without a medical diploma as quacks.

The Times was not

alone in attacking abortion in the editorial pages and with
sensationalization tactics.
Increased commercialization raised public awareness to
and sensitivity to the abortion issue.

The physicians' use

of fear and eugenics had an appeal to those typically in
positions of power, lawmakers able to influence abortion
patterns.

The environment for additional abortion

legislation was primed by the physicians' public
reconsideration of quickening and the role of women in
abortion.

Their rhetoric seeped into state legislatures,

and at times their influence upon the wording of laws was
virtually direct.

The increased public awareness of

abortion due to commercialization drew attention and forced
reaction to an act that was formerly private and used common
botanicals from the garden.

Businesses like Restell's

increased publicity; such exposure altered the nature of
abortive methods.

Patented concoctions and office visits
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joined the herbal preparations and physical routines
followed in the privacy of one's home as alternatives to
pregnancy.
The alteration in the nature of abortive services
affected the societal status of abortion.
public realm in two senses.

It entered the

People were relying on outside

business people to enable the termination of their
pregnancy.

In addition, the new patented abortifacients

opened the door to the world of commercial advertising.
These two developments were mutually reinforcing.

By

opening abortion to the public realm in advertisements, the
issue was then appropriate for the press.

The same business

that benefitted financially from abortion related
advertisements presented a sensational glimpse of the
abortion industry-

Physicians actively wrote letters to

editors in order to capitalize on the emerging public forum.
Once abortion services entered the public realm and were
advertised and addressed in the news papers, the public
monitoring of that activity followed.

As abortion became a

public, visible, and commercial phenomenon, legislatures'
involvement in the issue was increasingly justified.

Legislative Reactions to a Shifting Society

Accompanying the changes in the nature of the abortion
industry and the country's awareness of abortion were twenty
years of transitional abortion legislation.

Between 1840

and 1860 society, physicians, and lawmakers began to react
to the changes in the business of abortion.

The period's

legislation was not yet fully restrictive, but aspects of
the common law tradition were being altered by the passage
of statutes.
Massachusetts was the first state to pass a bill that
addressed abortion as its sole issue; formerly, it had
simply been attached to other criminal codes.

In 1845 the

governor of Massachusetts signed into law an anti-abortion
bill that made attempted abortion a misdemeanor, and a
felony if the woman died. Punishment was a one-to-seven year
jail sentence.

In an eight- year period spanning from 1849

to 1857, thirty-two abortion cases came before the court.
None of those cases led to conviction of the abortionist. 80
Though the law was on the books, the failure to successfully
prosecute thirty-two cases seems to prove that there was a
loophole rendering it unenforceable.
139
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adjust the common law definition of pregnancy; to be
pregnant one must be quick with child.

Proving that the

woman who sought an abortionist's services was pregnant
proved virtually impossible for the prosecution.

If not

proven to be quick the woman could have been seeking the
treatment for another condition.
The Massachusetts government passed the anti-abortion
statute in response to two trials of abortionists that ended
in acquittal.

Both cases were topics in the popular press

and came before Massachusetts courts.

Commonwealth v.

Luceba Parker began in 1843 when Parker was indicted.

She

was accused of providing instrumental abortions for three
different married women.
Supreme Court in 1845.

The case reached the Massachusetts
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw heard the

case and found Parker not guilty.

His ruling was based on

the Bangs decision which upheld the common law doctrine of
quickening.

Shaw adhered to the precedent that providing an

abortion prior to quickening was not a crime.

It was not

proven that quickening had occurred.81
The other major abortionist trial prior to the passing
of the anti-abortion law ended in a similar fashion.

Dr.

Alexander S. Butler was prosecuted because he provided an
operative procedure and the abortifacient ergot.

Also

indicted was Fenner Ballou who was the woman's lover and the
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party to finance the procedure.
both men innocent.
law.

A jury of their peers found

The basis of the decision was the common

The pregnancy was not, or could not be, proven to be

quickened.

As a result of the publicized trials, the

Massachusetts legislature responded with the anti-abortion
bill in an attempt to aid prosecution of such cases.
intended result was not actualized. 82

The

The law in

Massachusetts was a move toward restrictive legislation, but
it was not a significant divergence from the common law.
The issue of fetal development still prevented enforcement
of the law.

The quickening was firmly intact in the

courtroom, the statute did not break with the quickening
doctrine.
A major break with the common law tradition came with
the 1845 New York abortion law.

The first portion of the

law simply tightened existing sentences.

The woman's or

fetus' death was deemed second-degree manslaughter after
quickening.

According to the new law, any one to

"administer to any pregnant woman, or prescribe for any such
woman, or advise or procure any such woman... with intent to
procure miscarriage" faced a jail sentence of three to
twelve months.
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that rendered it essentially unenforceable —

determining

pregnancy hinged on quickening.83
The truly new portion of the law dealt with the
culpability of the woman herself.

Until the passage of the

1845 New York law, the common law tradition exempting the
woman from guilt was honored throughout the United States.
She was guilty if she performed the abortion alone, sought
the services of an abortionist, and for allowing the
abortion to be carried through.

The woman faced three to

twelve months in jail and or a $1,000 fine.

The woman's

jail sentence equaled that of the potential sentence of an
abortionist.

For the first time at law, the woman was as

responsible as the person performing the procedure.

The

break with the exemption of women introduced an entirely new
concept in abortion law.

The step was significant, though

it was not once enforced during the nineteenth century.

As

a result it was a revolution in the theory of abortion law,
not in its enforcement.
The motivating factors behind the 1845 bill, including
the efforts of Dr. Gunning Bedford, proved as interesting as
its results.

Bedford was attempting to specialize in his

medical practice, choosing to pursue obstetrics and
gynecology.

Throughout the 1840s Bedford denounced Madame

"cited in Cyril C. Means, "The Law of New York Concerning
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Restell —

the two were competitors.

Other physicians

rallied in support of Bedford's efforts.

The physicians led

a campaign that denounced the new commercialization trend in
abortion services.

Such commercialization was coined

"Restellism" by Bedford and supporting regulars.

The

regulars began to see that abortion could not be ended
simply by punishing the party providing the service.
According to one New York physician in 1846, "Restell is to
be looked upon as an effect, rather than a cause... The
legislature must go to the root of the evil, of which this
abomination [Restellism] is the fruit.

That root, I am

satisfied, is popular ignorance and prejudice, founded on
that ignorance.1184
As physicians began to recognize that the nature and
target of abortion law needed change, the legislature of New
York apparently did as well —
with common law.

as evidenced by the break

The fact that abortion was seemingly

serious enough to require the fundamentals of common law be
changed suggests that abortion was frequent and that it was
not as heinously dangerous as regulars and press
sensationalists were indicating.

The regulars were

politically involved and Bedford even had an influential
relationship with the mayor of New York.85

In addition to
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the physicians' influence, the popular press also played a
role.
The National Police Gazette sensationalized abortion
stories during the mid-1840s.

The editors strongly called

for increased regulation of abortion.

According to Mohr,

the declining birth rate also influenced New York
legislators.

Women were bearing fewer children and

legislators viewed this as negative, according to a
statement made by a

New York physician.

The active, anti-

Restellism regular noted that, "checks on population... At
present, and in this country, population is wealth and a
blessing, and the public is not disposed to look with favor
upon any means for keeping it down." 86

Fear of a population

drop in combination with timely sensationalization in the
public press, as well as physicians' desire to remove
competition from abortionists, all influenced the
introduction and passage of New York's 1845 law.
Just as New York determined that another legal method
was necessary to curb abortion activity, Massachusetts also
explored alternative laws.

New York's method, on paper, was

to hold the women responsible and attempt to halt the
abortion business.

In Massachusetts the method was to

hinder abortion related advertising.

The idea was to

eliminate access to knowledge about where to find
abortionists and abortifacients making it inaccessible.
86
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1847 prohibition of advertisements was born of concerns
about the declining number of births since abortion and
contraception were linked by the law.

According to the law

Whoever knowingly advertises, prints, publishes,
distributes or circulates, or knowingly causes to
be advertised, printed, published, distributed or
circulated, any pamphlet, printed paper, book,
newspaper notice, advertisement or reference,
containing words or language giving or conveying
any notice, hint or reference to any person, or to
the name of any person, real or fictitious; from
whom, or to any place, house, shop or office
where, any poison, drug, mixture, preparation,
medicine, or noxious thing, or any instrument or
means whatever, or any advice, direction,
information or knowledge, may be obtained for the
purpose of causing or procuring the miscarriage of
a woman pregnant with child or [of] preventing, or
which is represented as intended to prevent,
pregnancy, shall be punished by imprisonment
in the state prison for not more than three years
or in jail for not more than two and one half
years or by a fine of not more than one thousand
dollars.87
The bill treats abortion more as a method of family
limitation and less as a moral issue of life and death.
Prior to quickening, abortion was equated more closely with
contraception.

The measure resulted in frustration for

anti-abortion crusaders concerning the unenforceable nature
of the abortion laws thus far.

Advertisement could be

regulated while monitoring abortion was proving
unsuccessful.
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The inclusion of the word "knowingly" softened the law
which was intended to be a forceful measure against
advertising.

"Knowingly" introduced a loophole for the

publishers and distributors of newspapers.

This left room

for the continuation of advertising so long as it was subtle
and veiled.

If the intention of the advertisement was not

clear, the newspapers could feign ignorance.
In 1846 Vermont introduced its first legislation
addressing abortion.

The law criminalized the attempted

abortion of quickened children.

If the woman died from the

abortion attempt, it constituted a felony.
its first legislation in 1846 as well.
resembled that of New York.

Michigan passed

Michigan's law

The state legislature deemed

abortion at any time a crime punishable with a maximum $500
fine or a year in jail.
considered manslaughter.

Abortion after quickening was
Michigan also included a

therapeutic exception clause requiring the opinion of two
physicians.88

That law granted them a special power; in

Virginia, one doctor in particular was able to wield his
power and influence the penning of a law.
Two years later Virginia passed a criminal code that
included a section concerning abortion.

According to

historian James Mohr, the portion was essentially written by
88
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Richmond physician Levin S. Joynes, demonstrating the
influence of the medical profession on Virginia's abortion
law.89

The statute was different because it dealt with the •

death of a fetus, rather than attempted abortion or the
death of the woman.

The punishment varied based on the

level of fetal development.

Terminating the development of

a fetus before quickening was punishable with a jail
sentence of one to twelve months.

The death of a quickened

fetus was punishable with one to five years in jail.90

The

law was framed in such a manner that avoiding prosecution
was simple. The language of the law required possession of
the dead fetus in order to successfully prosecute an alleged
abortionist.

The fetus was the only evidence indicating the

stage of gestation and verifying that growth had been
halted.
In 1849 California confronted the abortion issue.

The

revision of the California code included a section regarding
abortion.

The result was the criminalization of abortion

only after the woman was clearly pregnant —
quickening.91

after

The same year, Wisconsin defined its legal
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terms concerning abortion in a larger criminal code.

The

Wisconsin law rendered performing an abortion a crime after
quickening.92

Wisconsin and California both held to the

common law notion that abortion prior to animation was
legal.
New Hampshire also enacted legislation in 1849.

The

law meant New Hampshire was the second state to diverge from
the tradition exempting women themselves from prosecution.
Abortion was punishable with a maximum one year in jail or a
$1000 fine.

After quickening the punishment was raised to

the monetary fine plus "confinement to hard labor not less
than one year, nor more than ten years."93

If the abortion

resulted in the woman's death, the abortionist could be
charged with second-degree manslaughter.
A significant section of the New Hampshire bill failed
to pass in both the House and Senate.

That portion would

have made "any person who shall be knowing to the violation
of the provisions of this act, and shall neglect to expose
the same" subject to a maximum of one year in jail or $1000
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in fines.94

That provision would have changed the nature of

abortion legislation.

No longer would it be an issue

between a woman and her abortionist; any member of the
community aware of such activity could be prosecuted for
failing to expose the woman and the abortionist.

If that

provision had been accepted, abortion would have become a
community issue —
individuals.

everyone responsible for the activity of

Population rhetoric already raised the

abortion issue to the community level.

Abortion, in various

speeches, was called a crime against the community since
there was a growing disparity in population.

The failure of

the legislature to pass that measure signified that law
makers were not yet ready to institute a law that pitted
neighbor against neighbor.
An 1849 New Jersey Supreme Court case propelled the
passage of an abortion bill that same year. Chief Justice
Henry W. Green upheld the common law tradition.

In the

State v. Eliakim Cooper Green held that abortion attempted
prior to quickening was not illegal so long as the woman
consented to the procedure.
in that ruling.

Green included self-abortions

Green refused to break with common law

tradition and noted that the legislature must act to change

94
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the tradition before the courts could diverge from the
precedent.95
New Jersey responded with a bill that maintained
immunity of the woman herself but criminalized abortion
attempts.

The legislature also banned providing advice on

abortion methods.

If such advice resulted in the death of

the woman, the offense became significantly more severe.
The New Jersey Supreme Court heard a case challenging the
1849 law.

In 1858 Chief Justice Green heard the case of

State v. Leonard Murphy.

Murphy, accused of providing

directions for the use of abortifacients, was found guilty
in the lower court decision, and again by the New Jersey
Supreme Court.

The decision of the court examined the

nature of the law when it was passed.

The court determined

that the law was a safety-based law meant to protect women
from men like Murphy-

Green declared that the law was

passed to modify the common law tradition as called for in
his 1849 State v. Eliakim Cooper decision.

According to

Green's opinion, "The design of the statute was not to
prevent the procuring of abortions, so much as to guard the
health and life of the mother against the consequences of
such attempts."96

The law addressed dangers women faced

from incompetent abortionists, not abortions performed
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safely during the early stages of gestation when the
procedure was least dangerous.
The territories of Minnesota and Oregon passed their
first abortion statutes along with their criminal codes in
1851 and 1854, respectively.
quickening distinction.

Both statutes maintained the

Unless the procedure injured the

woman, abortion prior to quickening was legal.

In 1854,

Washington Territory passed a law which maintained women's
immunity but criminalized all abortion attempts.
Washington's statute used the clearest language by making it
criminal to attempt abortion on a pregnant woman or a woman
supposed to be pregnant.

The Territory of Kansas passed a

criminal code revision in 1855 that included an abortion
section.

It made abortion a misdemeanor regardless of

quickening, though intent and pregnancy had to be proven.
The intent clause rendered the law essentially
unenforceable.97
In 1854, Texas assigned an unusually stiff prison
sentence of up to ten years for post-quickening abortions.
In 1856 Texas reformed the statute, and the applicable
sentence was decreased to between two and five years.

In

instances of abortion when the woman did not consent, the
sentence was between four and ten years.

97
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legislature also added to the statute that if the woman died
due to the abortion then the abortionists would be tried on
murder charges.

Those supplying abortifacients were

considered accomplices to murder if the woman died.

Texas

did leave room for a therapeutic exception if the woman's
life was in danger if the pregnancy continued.98

In 1856

Louisiana passed a law attaching similarly severe jail
sentences to post-quickening abortions.

The Louisiana

legislature deemed an abortionist should be punished with
one to ten years of hard labor in prison.99
Dr. William Henry Brisbane was the driving force behind
the passage of Wisconsin's abortion statute in 1858.
Brisbane informed fellow crusader Dr. Horatio Storer that
It is my present intention to endeavor to get a
law passed by our legislature to meet the case,
much too common, of administering drugs and
injections either to prevent conception or destroy
the embryo. It is an undoubted fact that,
especially in high life, and in the middle ranks
of society, many wives (and often with the
connivance of their husbands) take measures
of this kind.
Brisbane recognized that the law would most likely prove
unenforceable but thought "the existence of a law making it
criminal, would probably have a moral influence to prevent
it to some extent."100

On May 19, 1859, Brisbane mailed Dr.
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Storer a note, attached to the law, saying "I succeeded in
having enacted by our legislature the following statute."101
With Brisbane's influence,

Wisconsin became the third

state to remove women's immunity.

The law stated that

"every woman who shall take any medicine, drug, substance,
or thing whatever, or who shall use or employ any
instrument, or shall submit to any operation or other means
whatever, with intent to procure a miscarriage" to be in
violation of the law.

Such women faced one to three months

in jail or a fine up to $300.102

The abortionist still faced

a greater conviction for second-degree manslaughter, but the
woman's guilt is significant nonetheless.

It was a break

with common law; with the removal of women's immunity
abortion law was more prohibitive and no longer protective
in nature.
It is significant that Brisbane referred to the
husband's connivance in the abortion act and also pushed a
law that removed women's immunity.

If husbands were giving

their tacit encouragement to wives seeking an abortion,
perhaps both the husband and the woman would seriously
consider the ramifications of doing so.

It is likely that

100
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just as the women may have hesitated to abort based on a
fear of legal punishment, so too the husbands might hold
back their encouragement if their wives imprisonment was a
distinct possibility.

Brisbane's power to affect the law

and the removal of women's immunity corresponded with the
trend of the regular physician's increasing legal leverage.
The removal of immunity was consistent with the regulars'
belief that conception began fetal life.

That belief

reinforced the idea that women are as criminal as the
abortionists.

The law in Wisconsin represents a departure

from abortion law as protective legislation.

Wisconsin's

action exemplifies the broad trend away from laws concerned
with the protection of women to laws targeting women.
Indiana revised its 1835 abortion statute in 1859
because it was typical of unenforceable abortion
legislation.

The revision was motivated by a distaste for

the number of abortion advertisements circulating around the
state.

Advertisements excerpted from the newspaper were

highlighted during the debating of the bill.

The bill made

a criminal of any person selling a medicine capable of
procuring abortion or miscarriage.

The legislature added an

intent clause that provided a loophole for abortionists.
The clause only made selling abortifacients illegal if sold
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with the intent of inducing abortion.103

Intent provided a

slippery escape; abortifacients had dual purposes.
Iowa was without an abortion law when it became a
state.

The sections of the territorial code that dealt with

abortion were omitted upon statehood.
raised the abortion issue.

A slander court

Abrams v. Foshee and Wife

involved Mrs. Foshee making public statements that Mrs.
Abrams had aborted multiple fetuses.
slander charges and prevailed.

Abrams sued Forshee on

Iowa's Supreme Court heard

the appeal and reversed the decision.

The judgment was

based on the fact that abortion was not illegal.

Since

abortion was legal, it was not slander to accuse someone of
abortion.

The judge determined that having the public know

of one's abortion habits would not ruin her standing in the
community.

The ruling stated that such accusations would

not "exclude [a woman] from society and render her infamous
in the common sense of that term."104

Abortion was not equal

to questioning someone's chastity, which would be slanderous
at law.

Accusations of abortion were compared to

accusations of being a tattler, liar, person who swears, or
a drinker.
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The state supreme court decision sparked a new abortion
statute.

Dr. D.L. McGugin contacted an Iowa senator and

called for a law in response to the Foshee decision.
McGugin's senator introduced an abortion bill in 1858, but
it was relatively lax.

Using an instrument on or providing

medicine to a pregnant woman with the intent of procuring an
abortion was punishable by up to $1000 or one year in
jail.105

The wording of the bill referred to attempts after

quickening, and the intent clause made the law basically
unenforceable.
The law was an issue in another slander suit, Hatfield
v. Gano.

A woman was accused of self-abortion and sued on

slander charges.

The Iowa Supreme Court in 1863 stated, "It

is clear to us from the wording of [the 1858 law], that it
is the person who used the means with the pregnant woman to
procure the abortion, and not the woman herself, that the
legislature intended to punish."106

Since the woman herself

was not liable, it was not slanderous to accuse someone of
self-induced abortion.

Iowa's slander suits and the nature

of the laws revised and introduced between 1840 and 1860
illustrate that abortion itself was not considered a heinous
crime.

The laws, with the exception of the three states

mentioned, targeted the abortionist.

They remained mostly

protective pieces of legislation, or they attempted to
105
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target the increased and blatant advertising of
abortifacients and abortion services.
The influence of individual physicians was also
becoming apparent during that time period.

The collective

involvement of the physicians became even more apparent; the
American Medical Association, AMA, was founded in 1847.

The

organization was able to channel the power that had been
dispersed among individual physicians.

The collective power

of the AMA was greater than that of individual physicians
pursuing the same goal.

The AMA had an agenda that included

elevating the status of its member physicians and the antiabortion campaign would become a crucial part of that
effort.

Physicians Unite

The American Medical Association was founded in 1847 to
strengthen the position of American physicians.

The

prominent physicians that organized and professionalized
sought to remove competition from the abundance of people
practicing medicine.

There were institutions passing out

medical degrees without an emphasis on research and
scientific method.

There were also homeopaths and midwives

practicing medicine as they always had.

One means of

promoting dominance by regular physicians was to push for
licensing laws and self-regulation of the profession.

The

status of physicians, however, was not high enough that
licensing alone would propel the institution.

The

physicians used the abortion issue as a rallying point for
physicians to unite and be heard.

Abortion was an issue

that had convenient consequences, making it the ideal
unifier for physicians.107

They emerged from the nineteenth

century as the only group powerful enough to allow an
abortion.

The irony of that role is thick, particularly

given the prohibition of abortions in the Hippocratic Oath
107
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and the abundance of rhetoric that abortion was an absolute
wrong.
Since knowledge of pregnancy had advanced, and
physicians accepted that life began at conception, they were
able to make decisions of life and death.

No other party

was able to make that decision, not even the pregnant woman.
That ability in essence raised the physician to a position
of power equal to that of clergy and judge.

The three were

moral arbitrators and powerful enough to make decisions
immediately influencing individuals.
Physicians adopted moral arguments as the dominant
criteria for prohibiting abortion.

Arguments of morality

and natural law bolstered the rhetoric concerning eugenics
and alteration of women's traditional functions.

The 1871

AMA report relied on arguments from St. Paul and the Bible.
Abortion was condemned as it diverged from the laws of
nature and God.

The physicians preached God's law, not

strictly medicine.108

Dr. O.E. Herrick referred to this

phenomena as "half preacher and half doctor."

Herrick

continued to comment on the abundance of physicians tangled
in preaching.109
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Literature reflecting the moral arguments of the AMA
was a major component of their agenda.

The abortion issue

was a sounding board for the newly organized physicians to
rally around, and this rhetoric was ideal for catapulting
the physician into the role of moral arbitrator.

The

physicians had direct and indirect influence over state
legislatures and public opinion.

Physicians lobbied their

state legislatures, wrote letters to the editor, highlighted
abortion at their annual meetings, held essay contests for
anti-abortion material, and left evidence of loaded rhetoric
in books concerning obstetrics and women's health issues.
In effect, abortion legislation increased physicians' power.
According to historian Janet Farrell Brodie, they did so
successfully because they "'medicalized' what had not always
been a medical issue."110

Their status was elevated not only

because abortion was molded into a moral issue but also the
publicity created the image that physicians were specialists
—

the authorities of gynecology.
The physicians' campaign to regulate abortions through

legislation did not result in the prohibition of abortion.
In fact, what resulted was a reallocation of the power to
induce an abortion.

The ability to choose an abortion that

once rested with the woman carrying the embryo now lay with
the physicians.

Abortion legislation spelled out an

exception to the criminalization of abortion —
110
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acceptable to procure an abortion if the mother's life was
in danger.

Physicians were the group entrusted with the

power to decide.

Ten state laws stipulated that more than

one physician must agree that an abortion was necessary to
save the life of the mother.

The law in Maryland expressed

that a "respectable" physician make the proper
determination, and two states stated that only "regular"
physicians could authorize an abortion.
The power to override the abortion prohibition was
significant in elevating the status of regulars to that of
moral superior.

Physicians, in that respect, had become as

prestigious as members of the legal profession and the
clergy.111

They were officially entrusted with the power to

make life and death decisions.

The exception to the law

itself bolstered the physicians' power to a new level.
Doctors could provide abortion if they determined it to
be necessary to save the life of the mother.

That fact

alone symbolizes that, contrary to AMA rhetoric, abortion
was not an absolute wrong.

Storer preached that there was

to be no latitude even in extreme cases112; ironically, his
campaign rendered physicians the powerful group alone able
to make exceptions.

Though the AMA emphasized that the

embryo had the right to life, that right was balanced with
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the mother's right to life.

The mother's right took

priority over the life of the developing fetus, a priority
that physicians recognized, accepted, and arbitrated.
Not only could they make such a decision, but the
grounds justifying abortion were vague.

The phrase "to save

the life of the mother" can be read in a variety of ways.
Life can be assigned a very strict or loose definition.
Saving the life of the mother could refer to a situation in
which death is certain and immediate if the pregnancy is
carried to term.

The physician could also consider the long

term physical well being of the mother.

The legislation was

vague enough to allow considerations that extended beyond
physical status.

A physician was able to consider the

spiritual, emotional, mental, social, intellectual, and
financial life of the mother as well.

The access to

abortion by no means ceased, but physicians had the sole
discretion to determine when abortion was appropriate and
when it should be forbidden.

Not only was the status and

power of regulars increased by the crusade for abortion
legislation, but also the physicians could grant abortions
in a manner consistent with a desire to slow disparities in
the population growth.113
Physicians' efforts clearly colored the final phase of
abortion legislation in the nineteenth century.

Other

factors were also shifting that again increased the
113
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perception that abortion needed to be strictly regulated, if
not fully prohibited.

The same press that increased

abortion's visibility and commercialization ultimately aided
the effort to regulate abortion.
provides an excellent example.

The New York Times
The Times went through

various phases in its abortion coverage.

The attention to

abortion began in the 1840s by the Times and other urban
papers as a result of the influential physicians in New
York.

In 1863 the efforts of the AMA sparked an additional

emphasis on the negative aspects of abortion.

It is curious

that the Times sought to sensationalize abortion stories,
and to capitalize on the potentially horrific results of
abortion.

The Times had access to numerous tragic and

timely stories of the destruction of the Civil War.

The

Times reported the death of a woman who sought a surgical
abortion and declared that it was "high time that the
attention of the public be directed to the scoundrels who,
under the pretense of giving relief, entail direct misery
upon thoughtless women, and at times hurry rash mortals into
an undesirable eternity."114
As Madame Restell's business on Greenwich Street
flourished, the community began to notice.
was negative in some circles.
114
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New York Sunday Morning News and was distressed by Restell's
activity.

On July 7, 1839, Smith's editorial declared that

Restell's practice "strikes at the root of all social order
—

is subversive of all family peace and quiet —

generate jealousies and hate —

will

will demoralize the whole

mass of society, and make the institution of marriage a mere
farce."

Smith was convinced that "If the laws cannot reach

her, the voice of the people will; yes, it will call upon
her in tones of thunder to abandon the nefarious trade in
which she is engaged, and which she dares to say has never
resulted in a failure."115

Smith believed his voice inspired

Restell's arrest in 1839.

The charges were dropped as the

prosecution's case was far from conclusive, and Restell
continued her activity unchanged until the anti-obscenity
fervor made room for the tyranny of Anthony Comstock in the
1870s.
Abortion law in the 1830s and 1840s was framed in a
manner that meant any conviction was impossible unless the
patient's death resulted.

As Smith predicted, the law was

unable to halt Restell's activity, but the newspapers were
able to influence the attitudes concerning abortion, and the
AMA's letter campaign influenced the newspaper industry.
The AMA's campaign and the representation of abortion
printed in the press increased the sense of urgency and
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legitimacy in the anti-abortion campaign.

Legislatures

responded to the environment created concerning abortion.
The slant appearing in the press significantly altered the
climate for regulation.

The AMA rallied to control the

presentation of abortion in order to further AMA goals.

Abandonment of Quickening

The twenty-year period between 1860 and 1880 witnessed
a flurry of legislative activity.

State and territorial

legislatures passed forty new and revised abortion statutes.
Although some common threads ran through the statutes, the
most significant commonality lies in the abandonment of the
quickening doctrine.

The legislatures were reacting to the

regular physicians' campaign against abortion.

A major

feature of that campaign was the physicians' assertion that
gestation was an uninterrupted process.

Without

interferance a human being emerged, and no point in that
process was more or less significant than any other moment.
The most crucial moment in the process was conception, all
other periods of gestation were equally important in the
formation of an infant.

The mother's ability to feel fetal

movement did not begin the life of the fetus, fertilization
did.

The shift in animation theory was an enormous

departure from traditional legal, medical, and social
thought in the United States.

The organized regulars were a

loud voice booming the conception message amongst themselves
and to their state legislatures.

During the late 1860s and

1870s, medical and scientific knowledge of bacteriology was
84
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increasing as was their exposure to laboratory work,
education, and research.

The image of regular physicians

was improving and their opinion was increasingly
influential.
The first major departure from all common law tradition
was in Connecticut's 1860 law categorizing a woman seeking
an abortion as criminal.

If she attempted to act as her own

abortionist or if she submitted to the aid of another, the
woman was subject to a sentence less severe than the
sentence for her abortionist, but she was punished
nonetheless.

The disparity in sentencing was a remnant of

the protective spirit of their former legislation.

The law

made abortion a felony with the abortionist facing up to
five years in prison or a maximum $1000 fine.

The law did

not mention quickening as a distinguishing moment, and
accomplices to the abortionist were also subject to
prosecution as felons.

Those people responsible for

distributing abortifacients and advertisements for
abortifacients faced a fine ranging from $300 to $500.

The

Connecticut law, like the great majority of others passed
during this period, changed very little during the next
hundred years.116
Pennsylvania revised its abortion law in 1860, making
abortion a crime regardless of whether or not the woman was

116

Quay, "Justifiable Abortion,
America, 201-202.

454; Mohr, Abortion

in

86
pregnant.

By removing the issue of pregnancy, the law

rendered quickening insignificant.
as it defined pregnancy.

Quickening was important

Since abortion was criminal with

or without pregnancy, there was no need to determine if
quickening had occurred.

That removed the burden of proof

and the question of intention when prosecuting an abortion
case.

The law applied to all attempts, not simply proven

successes.117
Several territories responded to the abortion
legislation activity rampant in the states.

The codes

introduced were reminiscent of earlier lenient provisions,
but their presence signifies that addressing the issue in
legislative form was standard.

In 1861 the territories of

Colorado and Nevada criminalized attempted abortions of
women carrying children.

Idaho, Montana, and Arizona

followed with the same measure in 1864.

The territorial

code was penned in a manner that allowed for confusion in
attempting to enforce the law.

In 1864 Oregon enacted a

much less ambiguous abortion law and removed quickening from
the law.

The offense was raised to a manslaughter charge in

instances when the woman was injured and when her health
remained intact.118

Since the offence remained regardless of
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the abortion's effect on the woman's health, manslaughter
reffered to the action upon the fetus —

a major difference

than the common law acceptance of abortion.
The deep South's Reconstruction governments joined in
the abortion reforms typical of the entire United States
during the period.

In 1866 the Alabama legislature

clarified its former code and increased the sentence facing
abortionists.

In 1868 Florida passed its first piece of

abortion legislation.

Abortion attempts at any period

regardless of the effects on the woman's health were
punishable by a maximum $1000 fine or between one and seven
years in prison.

Louisiana followed in 1870 with a revision

of its abortion code.

In addition to criminalizing

abortifacient medicines, the legislatures outlawed abortions
using instruments.119
In 1867 Illinois subjected abortionists to between two
and ten years of imprisonment.

Abortions which proved fatal

to the woman were considered murder under the new,
unanimously passed law.

The only exception was abortion

legitimated by therapeutic cause.
another unanimous law.

In 1872 Illinois passed

It targeted people disseminating

abortifacients and advertisements for abortion services.
The 1872 bill, like the 1867 law, made an exception for
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substances prescribed by "some well known and respectable
practicing physician."120
Ohio was still operating under its 1834 law that
resembled an anti-poisoning measure more than an antiabortion law.

In 1857 the Supreme Court of Ohio heard the

case of Edward Robbins v. State of Ohio.

Robbins was found

guilty of first degree murder by a jury at a lower court.
He provided Nancy Holly with four grains of strychnine in
order to procure an abortion.
resulted in Holly's death.

The consumption of strychnine

The Supreme Court overruled

Robbins' murder conviction based on his intention in
providing the substance.

The Court ruled, "Where a drug is

administered to a woman pregnant with a quick child, with
intent not to kill the woman, but to produce abortion, and
the woman dies from the effects of the drug, the offense
cannot constitute murder in the first degree."121

The

justices determined that though Robbins may have been able
to be found guilty of something, he was not able to be
convicted of murder.

The intent to abort and the intent to

murder were not related in the eyes of the court.
The Ohio state medical society campaigned heavily for
an anti-abortion law to update the 1834 law.

The special

legislative committee formulating the new bill was inundated
12
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with materials representing the AMA's beliefs.

Horatio

Storer's major works were among the information presented.
The committee highlighted information it had determined to
be accurate. They concluded that abortions in Ohio were
frequent and families were accustomed to using abortion as a
means to limit their number of offspring.

They also

determined that in rural and urban areas alike, "there is a
class of quacks who make child-murder a trade, and we regret
to add they are too well-patronized and sustained, to a
considerable extent, by public opinion.11122
The public support of abortion, they concluded, was
because the public accepted the quickening distinction.

The

committee obviously now rejected the quickening distinction,
and supported abandoning it even though their constituents
seemingly embraced the doctrine.

The significance of the

committee's position was that they were clearly ready to
impose laws that contained no hint of the common law
tradition.

The influence of the physicians upon the

legislature appears to have been more significant than the
tradition among the populace at large.

The committee also

reported that immigrant women aborted less frequently than
native born women.

The committee asked if native-women

"realize that in avoiding the duties and responsibilities of
married life, they are, in effect, living in a state of
122
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legalized prostitution?

Shall we permit our broad and

fertile prairies to be settled only by the children of
aliens?"123

On this basis the committee urged legislation.

The bill was born of a distaste for foreign immigrants, not
of fetal concern.
The committee's conclusion illustrates three ponits:
that married women were having abortions, that a nativist
motivation existed for legislation, and that the physicians
were more influential than popular opinion.

The committee

also suggested that the physicians' assertions of abortions
being highly dangerous were accurate.

That conclusion seems

to be contradicted by the seemingly frequent use of abortion
as a means of family limitation.

The safety issue was once

again twisted in order to support legislation.

Safety

provided a veil for physicians' ulterior motives.
The reality of nativist concerns was evident in the
close vote on an amendment that would have prohibited
abortion for married women only.

Single women in a socially

unacceptable situation would still have had immunity; women
in that position were often considered to be victims of
seduction.

The legislature was not firmly committed to the

fetus; it was merely a weak excuse for nativism and
physicians' control of the procedure.
original bill failed 14 to 15.

The amendment to the

The vote was close

illustrating a significant portion of legislators concerned
123

Ibid.
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solely about married women, specifically married, native
women.

The amendment failed based on a coalition between

members opposed to any further restriction on abortion and
those desiring a restriction on abortion for all women.

The

original bill passed 21 votes to 8 votes without the
amendment.

The resulting bill in 1867 intended to "prevent

the publication, sale, or gratuitous distribution of drugs,
medicines and nostrums intended to prevent conception, or
procure abortion."124
In 1867 Vermont abandoned the quickening doctrine but
maintained women's immunity only in cases of self-abortion.
The law also contained a section addressing the
advertisement and distribution of abortifacients.
practice was no longer allowed.

The

Fines for breaking that

restriction ranged from $200 to $500.125
The territory of Colorado revised its abortion code in
1867.

The code added a new twist to the therapeutic

exception.

The law legally justified abortion in instances

when serious bodily injury was certain.

The physicians were

given the power to make the exception and had more leeway
than simple instances of life versus death.

The physicians

124
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room to maneuver within the bounds of the law was expanded
in Colorado territory.126
Maryland passed its first piece of legislation
concerning abortion in 1867.

The circumstances surrounding

the passage of the law demonstrate the regular physicians'
ability to influence abortion legislation.

The law

prohibited the advertisement of abortion services and
abortifacients; it also provided rewards to informants.
Information assistance was essential for the prosecutor to
have a tight case —

the law permitted informant to testify

as a witness in court.

In addition, the bill outlined

significant punishments for those who acted as an
abortionist.

The section of the law concerning abortion was

added to a licensing law.

It was intended to ensure that

regular physicians held the dominant position in Maryland.
The law stifled the ability of irregulars to compete with
the professionalized class of physicians.

Area medical

societies pushed the legislation, and the result was
licensing laws and an anti-abortion law in Maryland.127
In 1867 the New York state medical society gathered and
compiled a general statement of desire with two specific
suggestions.

The medical society submitted the results to

126
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the committee on public health.

In 1868 the legislature

passed a law that corresponded with one of the physician's
suggestions —

they prohibited the publication of

advertisements that suggested abortion methods.

In 1869 the

other suggestion received a legislative response.
The physicians' submission stated that, "from the first
moment of conception, there is a living creature in the
process of development to full maturity."

They suggest that

terminating that process is equivalent to murder.

They

continued to state that, "this society will hail with
gratitude and pleasure, the adoption of any measures... that
will... arrest this flagrant corruption of morality among
women, who ought to be and unquestionably are the
conservators of morals and of virtue."128

Ironically as

women were revered as the moral fiber of society, they were
also accused of being parties to murder.

There is an

apparent contradiction in the physicians' philosophy of
women.

If morally superior, women would be able to make an

appropriate decision about abortion.

If women were

propagating murder, they could no longer be the conservators
of morality.

The contradiction was not apparent to the

physicians themselves or to the legislators they sought to
influence.

128
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The physicians encouraged the legislature to drop the
quickening doctrine, an efforrt that proved successful in
1869.

The law made successful termination of pregnancy,

regardless of fetal development, second-degree manslaughter.
Even unsuccessful abortion attempts were made a misdemeanor.
The traditional loophole was closed when the legislature
added that it was a misdemeanor whether or not the woman was
pregnant.

The accompanying punishment was between three and

twelve months in jail or a maximum $1000 fine.129
New York went even further by fine-tuning restrictions
on abortion in 1872 when the legislature accepted a
suggestion made by the Medico-Legal Society of New York.
Abortion was no longer considered a capital offense.

The

revision was seen as wise, since convictions of an
abortionist might prove more difficult if they faced capital
punishment.

The revision was not an act of toleration, it

was viewed as a practical maneuver to increase convictions.
When a woman consented to a procedure, it was doubtful that
a jury would call for the death of the person
perform the procedure.

requested to

The woman herself was also guilty of

a felony if she sought an abortion or performed one herself,
according to the 1872 law.130

129
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In 1869 the state legislature dismantled the Bangs
precedent set by the Massachusetts Supreme Court fifty-seven
years earlier.

Massachusetts revised its law and declared

that there no longer had to be proof of pregnancy in order
to successfully prosecute on abortion charges. 131

Removing

the need to prove pregnancy meant the demise of the
quickening distinction —

which had been the main method of

verifying pregnancy instead of some other irregularity.
In 1872 California passed a law that paralleled
Massachusetts's divergence from common law traditions.

The

woman was guilty of a crime if she was her own abortionist
or if she sought the assistance of an abortionist.

The law

also targeted the person performing the procedure and anyone
providing the necessary items.

The law stipulated that it

was illegal to attempt to abort any woman.
require that she be pregnant.

The law did not

The quickening doctrine was

no longer good law in California as of 1872.132
New Jersey revised its 1849 protective abortion law in
1872.

The new law was significant as it made the death of

the fetus an offense equal to the death of the mother.

New

Jersey legislators clearly accepted the evidence put forward
by physicians that pregnancy and life began at conception. 133
The following year Nebraska, Virginia, and Minnesota also
131
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embraced the concept of pregnancy as a process beginning at
conception.

They all passed laws that removed the

quickening distinction.

Minnesota's 1873 statute also

criminalized self-abortions, though the woman faced a
punishment less severe than an abortionist.

Her crime was

considered a misdemeanor while abortionists were deemed
felons.

The laws also contained anti-advertising sections.

The flurry of increasingly restrictive legislation
coincided with the strong handed tactics of Anthony
Comstock.

His anti-obscenity crusade began in the 1870s at

the national level, and was independant of the physicians'
efforts.

In March 1873 Congress passed the Comstock law.

It affected the abortion industry only in terms of
advertisements and mail order operations; it was geared to
halt obscenity in general.

Abortion was not the focus of

Comstockery, though it was at odds with the heavy handed
legal movement.

Comstock was granted the power to enforce

anti-obscenity regulations for the U.S. postal system and in
advertising.

Restell's demise in April of 1878 was a result

of his campaign.
Comstock.

Restell was arrested and harassed by

She killed herself before the highly publicized

case came to trial.

Comstock's success in derailing

Restell's service was reliant upon the transformation of
abortion law.

The media latched onto Restell's arrest, and

the prevailing opinion od abortion in the legislature no
longer supported Restell's methods.

Technically she was
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arrested for breaking anti-obscenity laws in advertisements.
The power structure's opinion of abortion had labeled it
obscene.

The result was a major victory for Comstockery.134

In 1875 Arkansas passed a law intending to restrict
advertisements and to terminate the quickening distinction.
Attempted abortion became a crime from the point of
conception.

Georgia followed suit in 1876.

abortion at any time was made a misdemeanor.

Attempted
Successful

abortion was equated with murder and was assigned a life
sentence as the punishment.135
State legislators between 1860 and 1880 produced
numerous and increasingly restrictive abortion laws.

The

quickening distinction was regularly removed from the law
books, and the traditional common law immunity of women was
vanishing as well.

The majority of legislation passed

during this period was altered very little for almost a
century.

Evidence of the effectiveness of the more

restrictive legislation is evident in the results of court
cases following the flurry of legislative activity.

The

physician's campaign to change perceptions of abortion
proved successful in state legislatures.

Legislative

efforts to restrict abortion and close loopholes in
prosecution also proved successful in the state courts.

134
135
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alterations increased the number of convictions as the
prosecutors' burden of proof was reduced.
The alterations in statutory law after 1880 were
relatively minor.

States did not reshape abortion law,

choosing instead to refine it.

In 1881 Indiana, North

Carolina, and New York all fine-tuned their abortion law.
Indiana imposed fines or jail terms on women consenting to
abortions.

North Carolina deemed abortion after quickening

to be a felony, and abortion at any time illegal.

New York

redefined sentencing in order to curb confusion and
dissension —

capital punishment was deemed to severe for an

abortionist fufilling a woman's request.

The following year

Iowa raised the jail sentence from one to five years.
In 1883 Tennessee, Delaware, and South Carolina passed
abortion statutes that went without alteration for almost
eight decades.

Arizona and Idaho mandated that consenting

women be charged as criminals.
years later.

Wyoming followed suit three

In 1891 Colorado increased the charge facing

abortionists from manslaughter to murder.

Alabama

significantly increased the potential jail term from between
three and twelve months to between two and five years.

In

1896 Rhode Island criminalized abortion at any stage of
gestation but maintained the woman's common law immunity.
Such revisions concluded abortion law tinkering for almost a
century.

During the same period as the final alterations,

the courts revealed an acceptance of the new philosophy
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governing conception and abortion.

The criminal courts had

traditionally been lenient in interpreting abortion laws,
but they were beginning to demonstrate a willingness to give
the benefit of doubt to the prosecution.
The legislative trend reduced much of the pressure on
the prosecution.

As the automatic loophole provided by

quickening was plugged in the legislatures, the courts
accepted the shifting burden of proof.

Prosecutors no

longer had to prove pregnancy or quickening in order to
successfully convict.

The defense was forced to prove that

the abortion was medically necessary in order to be
acquitted.

The Colorado supreme court determined in 1872

that simply intending to procure abortion, regardless of
success, was enough to convict an abortionist.
In the 1880 case of State v. Slagle, the North Carolina
Supreme Court affirmed the invalidity of the quickening
doctrine.

The court ruled that, "it is not the murder of a

living child which constitutes the offense, but the
destruction of gestation by wicked means and against
nature."136

The same year the New York Supreme Court

determined that quickening was no longer something that had
to be proven.

The prosecution's job was simply to establish

that an abortion had occurred.

In order to be found not

guilty, the abortionist was forced to prove that the
abortion was necessary.
136
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In 1882 the Massachusetts Supreme Court heard
Commonwealth v. Taylor.

The court articulated that there

was no need for the prosecutor to prove pregnancy or
quickening.

The court's main concern was no longer whether

or not the woman was pregnant or quickened.

The court was

more concerned with the fact that abortion had been
attempted.

The Taylor precedent overruled the same court's

Commonwealth v. Bangs ruling in 1812.
precedent died.

Once replaced the

The Bangs case clearly articulated the

common law theory that without proof of quickening,
pregnancy could not be established,

therefore, procuring

abortion before quickening was not criminal.

Bangs was

decided solely on the fact that there was no proof of
quickening, thus of pregnancy.

The Taylor case, by

contrast, was unaffected by the woman's stage of gestation
or proof of pregnancy.

In a seventy-year period the theory

of abortion and its law underwent a complete
transformation.137
Several cases represent the new willingness of the
courts to accept uncorroborated testimony by a woman also
implicated in the criminal case.

In People v. Vedder, an

1884 New York case, the judge allowed the woman's testimony
alone to convict the abortionist and the man that supported
her decision to abort.

137
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woman's testimony was interesting since she no longer
benefitted from her common law immunity.

In 1892 the

Massachusetts supreme court came to the same conclusion and
determined the unsubstantiated testimony by a woman also
criminally liable would be accepted in court.
Another example of the drastic changes in the outcome
of abortion cases was in Gus A. Eggart v. the State of
Florida.

The Florida supreme court convicted Eggart in 1898

simply because he suggested an abortifacient.

He was

convicted even though his suggestion was not used.138

The

court also reiterated that pregnancy and quickening were not
material to the case.

The courts were clearly demonstrating

a tightening in abortion law based on legislation.

Courts

were also displaying a willingness to provide the prosecutor
with the benefit of doubt where they had once made
convictions near impossible.

The court originally favored

the case of the abortionist based on the difficulty of
proving pregnancy and quickening.

Intent was extremely

difficult to establish and that had historically favored the
accused.
leniency.

The transformation in abortion law altered that
Increasingly the court accepted questionable

evidence and placed the burden of proving necessity on the
abortionist.

As the possibility of successfully prosecuting

an abortion increased, the laws became more meaningful.

138
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Legislatures removed language in statutes that provided an
escape route for abortionists.

Conclusion

At a lecture in 1868, Dr. Anne Densmore announced that
abortion at any stage of gestation was murder.
listening

Some women

fainted at the notion that they may have

participated in murderous activity. 139

This illustrates the

attitude common in America concerning abortion in the midnineteenth century.

Under the common law transplanted from

England, abortion prior to quickening was not considered a
crime, or even a deplorable act.

Several changes occurred

across the nineteenth century to alter that perception.

One

major factor was the activity of physicians desiring to
establish dominance in the field of medical service.
Physicians adopted abortion as a campaign.

They

challenged the notion that life began upon noticeable fetal
movement and announced that pregnancy was a continual
process that began at conception.
uninterrupted, was life.
about their belief.
editorial pages.

The result, if

The physicians were outspoken

Their opinions infiltrated journals and

They successfully sought to enlist the aid

of state legislatures and clergy to reinform people's
abortion perspective.
139
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only factor motivating physicians; they hoped to boost their
prestige and be classified as moral authorities.

With

increased prestige the physicians would be closer to
dominating the medical field and reducing competition from
"irregulars" including homeopaths and midwives.

"Regular"

physicians as moral authorities would be considered morally
superior to "irregulars" willing to perform abortions.
Other social factors aided the physicians' campaign and
supplied increased motivation to alter the common law of
abortion.

Notions of native superiority cleared the path

for a movement among the most powerful segments of society.
Abortions in the 1840s became increasingly common among
wealthy married women.

Abortions had formerly been a

recourse for the single woman shamed by pregnancy.

By the

1840s that stigma had changed; wives were seeking abortions
and it was no longer simply an alternative for the
desperate.

It had become a form of limiting the size of a

family.
This shift sent a Shockwave through minds of Americans
that feared the alteration of traditional familial roles.
Lower classes and the immigrant population were procreating
at a more rapid pace than native born Americans.

Concerns

about the population disparity fueled the drive to restrict
abortions.

Anti-abortion theorists held that WASP women

would match the procreation rate of "unsavories" if access
to abortion and abortifacients was denied at law.
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Population concerns were personal to regular physicians as
they were among the segment of the population that was
potentially going to be outbred.

Increased

commercialization, and thus visibility, of the abortion
phenomenon mutually reinforced the surge in abortions.

All

these issues increased sensitivity to abortion and created
an environment favorable for restrictive legislation.
These factors enabled and propelled the transition in
abortion legislation.

Common law accepted abortions prior

to quickening as benign, and even post quickening abortions
were simply considered misdemeanors.

Initial legislation

sought to protect women from potentially fraudulent and
dangerous commercial abortionists.

Gradually legislation

abandoned the quickening distinction.

The result was more

viable prosecutions since it had been virtually impossible
to establish that quickening had occurred.

Eventually the

prosecutor's case was no longer affected by the success of
the abortion or the issue of pregnancy.

Even the

advertisement of abortion services became illegal with the
advent of Comstockery.
labeled "obscene."

Abortion and abortifacients were

The most significant legislative shift

dealt with women's liability.

Lawmakers stripped women's

immunity to prosecution for consenting to an abortion and
performing the procedure themselves.

Abortion laws were

developed as a means to protect women, as the transformation
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progressed, protection of women was abandoned and the
legislation targeted women.
The emergence of the therapeutic exception was also
significant.

It empowered the very group that sought an

absolute prohibition of abortion to sanction the act.
Physicians had defined abortion as an absolute wrong.

The

result of their campaign was contradictory to their stated
abortion philosophy.

Abortion was only conditionally wrong,

and physicians were the only group allowed to make that
determination.

If abortion was absolutely wrong, then

physicians would not need the power to make exceptions.
What seemed like a limited power to determine necessity
actually increased physicians' power significantly.

An

exception was possible if necessary to save the life of the
mother.

Such a determination was made using a wide range of

criteria —

was quality of life a factor?

Also, how

damaging would a pregnancy have to be to the mother to
warrant an abortion —

could it be made only in instances of

certain death or would the physician make an exception if
permanent physical injury were imminent?

The ability to

make exceptions rested with physicians, and the wide variety
of ways to interpret the issue meant a certain diversity in
physicians' decisions.

The ability to interpret the issue

and decide if an abortion was to be allowed was empowering.
The physicians gained an exclusive and significant power.
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The aberration in American abortion history was
motivated by several interests —

some genuine and some

self-serving, as well as racist, and class-based.

The

increased prominence of the AMA and the domination of
medical services was furthered by the physicians'
involvement in the anti-abortion campaign.

The traditional

family, and the WASP family in particular, was also
bolstered.

The fear that WASP culture would be overrun and

tainted by foreign influences had a definite impact on the
willingness of Americans in power positions to tighten
abortion restrictions.

If there was not a way to mandate

that certain people not procreate, then the natives must be
forced to produce WASP babies and replenish native stock in
the United States.

The impulses to restrict abortion were

far deeper than a moral desire to preserve fetal life.
There were more odious intentions grounded in physicians'
economic interests and a superiority complex toward more
recent immigrants.
Social factors created an environment conducive to the
legislative shift, though society in general did not propel
the change in law.

The physicians lobbied state

legislatures and filled newspapers with editorials.
Physicians in many instances had direct influence in the
penning of statutes.

They were extremely public with their

desire to restrict abortion, and their language triggered
people's fear and sensitivities.

By mid-century the
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physicians' impulse worked its way into state legislatures.
The courts, which had traditionally been firmly committed to
tenets of the common law, were forced to follow the
statutory change.

The legislative shift was dramatic and

lasted for nearly a century.
The shift drove abortion underground unless sanctioned
by physicians as a medical necessity.

The shift marked a

dramatic break from the common law position on abortion at
the beginning of the nineteenth century.

For almost a

century the abortion law in the United States was at odds
with the common law commitment to legal abortions early in
gestation.

Abortion legislation underwent a second dramatic

shift in 1972.

In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme

Court supported a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy.
This right was articulated in such a manner that it
resembled the common law quickening tradition.
right diminished as gestation progressed.

The woman's

The aberration in

abortion legislation lasted between ninety and one hundred
years; it was driven by the physicians' campaign.

Both

quickening and the trimester system laid out by Justice
Harry Blackmun define an increase in fetal rights and a
decrease in maternal rights as the fetus develops. 140
Certainly advances in medical knowledge have changed
the abortion issue immensely, but the quickening distinction
has been a factor in the American abortion consciousness.
14
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It is ironic that physicians as a group did not oppose the
1972 liberalization of abortion laws given their influence
in the first American transformation of abortion law.
Physicians gained status and significantly reduced medical
competition with the first jurisprudential swing.

Certainly

some physicians have gained economically from the second
shift.

Another alteration in the abortion debate since the

transformation in the nineteenth century is that women
gained a political voice.

During the dwindling adherence to

quickening under pressure from the medical profession, women
were not empowered with a vote.

As the twentieth century

progressed, women's voice in the abortion issue has led to
increasing public fervor on both sides of the debate.
Given the resemblance between the common law stance and
the present stance on abortion, the virtual prohibition of
legal abortions is an aberration in U.S. jurisprudence.

In

order that such an exception occur the medical profession
exerted significant influence —
their collective power.

and ultimately increased

Societal conditions were ripe for

embracing the physicians' rhetoric given the nativist
sentiment swarming in the country.

The anti-abortion

crusade that buried the quickening distinction was motivated
by a great deal more than a moral concern for fetal rights.
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